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We often expect that parents care more about the well-being of
their children than anyone else and that they will always do what is
best for them. Unfortunately, there are instances in which parents
harm their own children in terrible ways. When such harm does occur,
the government must assume the role of child protector.
One of the primary means by which the government protects
the interests of children is through the appointment of guardians ad
litem. These individuals act as personal representatives for children
by advocating for their best interests amid complex legal proceedings
that often drastically impact the children’s futures. Known also as
“best friend,”1 the guardian ad litem “lends voice to the best interests
of the child so that the system will not fail to maintain a focus on
the forest through the trees.” 2
But there is one group of children who rarely enjoy the protection
of these guardians: prenatal children. This flaw in our judicial system
1. Charles T. Cromley, Jr., Comment, “[A]s Guardian Ad Litem I’m in a Rather
Difficult Position.”, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 567, 571 (1998) (“Originally the terms ‘guardian
[ad litem]’ and ‘best friend’ held distinctive legal connotations under Ohio law. Both roles
were as representatives of the child or another under legal incapacity. The distinction was
in the purpose of the appointment and representation. The next friend was a representa-
tive for the purpose of prosecuting a claim on the behalf of the child, whereas the guardian
[ad litem] was the representative for the purpose of defending the child from a claim.
Today, however, the distinction has largely been abandoned and the separate legal sig-
nificance of the terms lost in the blur.”).
2. Id. at 567.
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is due primarily to widespread ignorance of a prenatal child’s need for
legal protection along with an unwarranted fear of legal challenges in
the aftermath of Roe v. Wade.3 Only the state of Wisconsin4 has specif-
ically provided for the appointment of guardians ad litem for prenatal
children.5 This prevailing lack of legal representation leaves unborn
children vulnerable, not only to the irreparable harm that their own
mothers may inflict upon them, but also to the dangers posed by il-
legal abortion and infanticide as was so egregiously practiced in the
case of Dr. Kermit Gosnell in his “House of Horrors” scandal.6
This article examines the case for appointing guardians ad litem
for prenatal children in all cases involving substantiated allegations
of maternal substance abuse or whenever a concerned person dis-
covers that a pregnant women intends to obtain an illegal abortion.
To this end, the article is divided into five major parts.
Part I introduces the current role of guardians ad litem in the
United States and various foreign jurisdictions, including a discussion
of how they are appointed and for what purpose. Additionally, this sec-
tion examines the rights of prenatal children under international law.
Part II investigates the legal protections already afforded to pre-
natal children, which include the right to receive medical treatment
against their mothers’ wishes, as well as various civil and criminal
penalties against persons who harm or kill prenatal children.
Part III assesses the propriety and necessity of appointing guard-
ians ad litem for prenatal children and explains why legal represen-
tation is vital to their protection. At the outset, this section will
scrutinize the Kermit Gosnell “House of Horrors” scandal in which
a clinical physician illegally aborted numerous viable prenatal chil-
dren and committed countless acts of infanticide.7 For over a decade,
these atrocities went unchecked, unrestrained, and unregulated by
the very agencies that should have intervened years before his illegal
practices were exposed.8 Additionally, this section examines some of
the most common arguments against appointing guardians ad litem
for prenatal children and articulates why such arguments are un-
persuasive. Finally, this section explores how prenatal children are
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.235(1)(f) (West 2012).
5. The terms “prenatal child,” “prenatal baby,” and “unborn child” used throughout
this article are all synonyms for “fetus.” The term “fetus” is considered to be “offensive,
dehumanizing, prejudicial, [and] manipulative” and has been termed an “F-word.” Terrence
McKeegan, Heavyweight Philosophers Clash at Abortion Conference, C-FAM (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.c-fam.org/fridayfax/volume-13/heavyweight-philosophers-clash-at-abortion
-conference.html (quoting John Finnis, professor emeritus at Oxford University).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.A.
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acutely susceptible to abuse and neglect and argues that Roe v. Wade,
although applicable to legal abortions, is irrelevant in child protective
proceedings since guardians ad litem are already being appointed to
represent prenatal children in a wide variety of other legal contexts.9
Part IV outlines existing child welfare legislation, found only in
the state of Wisconsin, which specifically provides guardian ad litem
representation for prenatal children if and when their mothers abuse
alcohol or drugs during pregnancy. This significant statute permits
the government to take pregnant women into custody for the sole pur-
pose of protecting the health of their unborn children.10
Part V, the final section of this article, proposes some legislative
solutions and a model statute which will effectively expand existing
child welfare legislation to include guardian ad litem representation
for prenatal children in all cases involving substantiated allegations
of maternal substance abuse and planned illegal abortion. When
pregnant women are unwilling or unable to properly care for their
own, these unborn children both need and deserve legal representa-
tion. Who better than a guardian ad litem to vigorously champion
their cause?
I. THE ROLE OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN THE UNITED STATES
AND FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
A. The Role of Guardians Ad Litem in the United States
Every state, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands currently have statutes providing guardian ad litem repre-
sentation for children who have already been born.11 In federal
9. See infra Part III.G.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-11 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.125(b) (West 2012);
ARIZ. JUV. CT. R. P. 70(A); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f) (West 2012); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 326.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-203(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-129a(2)(B) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(b) (West
2012); D.C. CODE § 16-316(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.807(2)(a) (West 2012); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-98(a) (West 2012); 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 13308 (2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 587A-16 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1614 (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/2-17.1 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-6-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633A.6306 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 620.100(1)(d) (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 607(A) (2012); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1501 (2011); MD. R. FAM. LAW § 9-205.1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215,
§ 56A (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260C.163(5) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-8(1)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.160 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-358(1) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.100(1) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C:10 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-92 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-1-7
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cases, courts “may appoint, and provide reasonable compensation
and payment of expenses for, a guardian [ad litem] for a child who
was a victim of, or a witness to, a crime involving abuse or exploita-
tion to protect the best interests of the child.”12 In addition, our fed-
eral government has passed legislation apportioning federal funds
to the states for the specific purpose of improving and funding state
child protective services agencies.13 One of the primary objectives dis-
cussed in this federal legislation is “improving legal preparation and
representation, including—(i) procedures for appealing and responding
to appeals of substantiated reports of abuse and neglect; and (ii) pro-
visions for the appointment of an individual appointed to represent
a child in judicial proceedings.”14 In most states, these individuals are
called guardians ad litem; however, a handful of jurisdictions refer
to them as court-appointed special advocates or something else.15 In
Maryland, for example, these appointed individuals are referred to
as “Child’s Best Interest Attorney[s].”16 In thirty-three states, a
guardian ad litem is, or can be, an attorney.17 Guardians ad litem
(West 2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1016 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-601
(West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.281 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-102(c) (West 2012); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 419B.231 (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2741(b) (West 2012); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-14 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-720 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8A-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149(a)(1) (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.11 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-902(1) (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, § 5112 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (West 2012); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 2542 2012; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.053(1) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-
9-302 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.40(1) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211
(West 2012).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(h)(1) (2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) (2006).
14. Id. § 5106a(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
15. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f) (West 2012) (attorney ad litem); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 620.100(1)(d) (West 2012) (“court-appointed special advocate”); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 607(A) (2012) (“independent counsel”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-92 (West
2013) (“Court Appointed Special Advocate”).
16. MD. R. FAM. LAW 9-205.1(c)(1)(A).
17. ALA. CODE § 26-14-11 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.125(b) (West 2012); ARIZ.
JUV. CT. R. P. 70(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-3-203(3) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129a(D) (West 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(b)(1) (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-316(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.807 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-98(a) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-
1614 (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17.1 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-2205(a) (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 607 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.630 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-8(1)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.160(5) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205(1) (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 42-358(1) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.100(1) (West 2011); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. 169-C:10 (2013); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1016 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7B-601(a) (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2741(b) (West 2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149 (West 2012); TEX. FAM.
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are typically appointed to represent the best interests of children in
dependency proceedings, but some states also allow these advocates
to be appointed in adoption cases and child custody disputes.18
Typically, guardians ad litem are appointed at the very outset
of the judicial proceedings involving a child, e.g., after a petition for
adoption or paternity has been submitted in a custody dispute, or
after a petition alleging abuse or neglect has been filed in a depend-
ency action.19 In abuse and neglect cases, such petitions are almost
always initiated by third parties who have observed the child first-
hand and suspect abuse or neglect.20 Many of these petitions stem
from reports made by lay individuals, while over half are made by
various professionals, such as teachers, medical personnel, social
CODE ANN. § 51.11(c) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-902(1)(a)(i) (West 2012); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 26.44.053(1) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.40(2) (West 2011); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211 (West 2012).
18. For examples of statutes appointing guardians ad litem in cases of neglect and
abuse, see ALA. CODE § 26-14-11 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-203(1) (West 2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(a)(1) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17.1
(West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 607(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1501
(2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-121 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.160 (West 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-112 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 169-C:10 (2013); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1016 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-601 (West 2012); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B)(1) (West
2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-102(c) (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-14
(West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-18 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149 (West
2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-227 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-211 (West
2012). For examples of statutes appointing guardians ad litem in cases of adoption or
child custody disputes, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.125(b) (West 2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-129a(2)(B) (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-316(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.807(2)(a) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-98(a) (West 2012); 19 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 13308 (2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-6-1 (West 2012); Md. R. Fam. Law § 9-205.1; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 56A (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-8 (West 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-205 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.100 (West 2011);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-720 (2012).
19. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-22(b) (2012); ALASKA R. CINA P. 11(a)(1); CAL R. CT.
5.662(c); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 326.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-
203(1) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 16-316 (2012);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-44(a) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17 (West 2012);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.179 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205(a) (West 2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-8 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.462 (West 2012); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-1411 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-104.05 (West 2012); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 432B.500(1) (West 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1016, 1033-b(1)(a) (McKinney
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-601(a) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.4
(West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-306(B) (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 40-11-14 (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.011(a) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78A-6-902, 78B-7-202 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (West 2012); W. VA. R.
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT P. 52(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.40(1) (West 2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-312 (West 2012).
20. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT ix (2009), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf.
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workers, or law enforcement agents.21 These professions are usually
governed by the “mandatory reporter” statutes found in every state.22
In most cases, guardians ad litem are appointed by judicial offi-
cers sua sponte, often pursuant to specific statutory requirements.23
21. Id. at 6 (“For [Federal Fiscal Year] 2009, professionals submitted three-fifths of
reports. Education personnel (16.5%), legal and law enforcement personnel (16.4%), social
services personnel (11.4%), and medical personnel (8.2%) accounted for more than one-half
(52.5%) of all reports. Professionals have reported more than one-half of all reports for
the past 5 years.”).
22. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.020(a) (West 2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402 (West 2012);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2012);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (West
2012); D.C. CODE § 4-1321.02 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2012); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-5 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1(a) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 16-1605(1) (West 2012); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-33-5-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
2223(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 609 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-A(1) (2011); MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 5-704 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 21, 51A (West 2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (West 2012);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353(1) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(1) (West 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-711(1) (West 2012);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3(A) (West 2012); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-301 (West 2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-03(1) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101(B) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 419B.010(1) (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6311(a), 6386 (West 2012); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-3(a) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-310(A) (2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a) (West 2012); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West 2012); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 4913(a) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509(A) (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.44.030(1) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2(a) (West 2012); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (West 2012).
23. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-304(a) (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.125(b) (West 2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-522(A) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f) (West 2012); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3150 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-111, 15-14-115 (West 2012);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-136 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 721(c) (West
2012); D.C. CODE § 16-914(g) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.807(2), 61.401 (West 2012); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-9(b), 15-11-98(a), 19-7-44(a) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-16(a)
(West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1614(1) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-
17(1) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-6-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.112(2),
232.126, 232.179 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2205(a) (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE
ANN. art. 607(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1507(1) (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209, § 38 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.630, 722.24 (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163(5) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-15-107, 93-17-8 (West
2012); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.160(1), 211.462(1), 453.025(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-3-112, 41-3-607(4) (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-358(1), 43-163(1) (West
2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 128.100(1), 432B.500(1) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 169-C:10, 461-A:16 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-
32(J) (West 2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1016 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7B-
600(a), 7B-601, 48-2-201(b) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-07.1-05.1, 27-20-48,
50-25.1-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(A) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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Not surprisingly, courts enjoy broad discretion in ordering guardian
ad litem representation for children under whatever circumstances
they deem appropriate.24 However, a guardian ad litem may also be
appointed upon the motion of a party to the proceedings.25
Guardians ad litem, or court-appointed special advocates, are fre-
quently chosen from a pool of attorney or non-attorney volunteers who
have received particularized training in advocating for the best inter-
ests of children.26 Every jurisdiction has its own unique appointment
procedure, comprising variations on a common theme. In Alaska, for
example, the guardian ad litem may be an employee of the Office of
Public Advocacy.27 In the District of Columbia, the guardian ad litem
is selected from a list of attorneys prepared and maintained by the
Family Court.28
In all jurisdictions, the function of an appointed guardian ad
litem is to represent and advocate for the child’s best interests in the
legal system.29 Specifically, the duties of these advocates include, but
are not limited to: meeting with the child in person at least once and
preferably on a regular basis, conducting an independent investiga-
tion of the circumstances giving rise to the judicial proceedings, writ-
ing reports for the court, attending all hearings involving the child,
explaining the proceedings to the child in a manner that he or she can
tit. 10A, § 1-4-306(A)(2) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2(1) (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5334(a), 5335(a) (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-14 (West 2012);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-3-810, 63-9-720 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-9, 26-8A-20
(2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-132(a), 37-1-149(a), 37-1-610(a) (West 2012); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78A-2-227(1), 78A-2-228(1), 78A-6-902 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 669,
tit. 15A, § 3-201, tit. 33, § 5112 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (West 2012); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.34.100(1), 13.36.080, 26.12.175(1)(a), 26.44.053(1) (West 2012); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-302 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.235(1) (West 2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-3-211, 14-6-216 (West 2012).
24. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-203(1) (West 2012) (“Nothing in this section
shall limit the power of the court to appoint a guardian [ad litem] prior to the filing of a
petition for good cause.”).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-22(b) (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.310(a) (West
2012); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-11-9(b) (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-33 (West 2012);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-07.1-05.1, 14-09-06.4, 27-20-48 (West 2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5334(a) (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-149(a)(1) (West 2012).
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-304(c) (2012); ALASKA R. CINA P. 11(c); CAL. R. CT.
5.655; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(c)(2) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-9.1(a)(1)
(West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17(9) (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-830 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-112(2) (West 2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-149(2) (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.004(b), 107.011(b)
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-902(3)(b) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.12.175(3) (West 2012).
27. See ALASKA R. CINA P. 11(a)(2).
28. See D.C. R. NEGLECT & ABUSE 42(a).
29. See Cromley, Jr., supra note 1, at 567 (“Sometimes known also as a ‘best friend,’
the guardian [ad litem] lends voice to the best interests of the child so that the system will
not fail to maintain a focus on the forest through the trees.”).
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understand, monitoring the child’s case, and determining whether the
services offered to the child and his or her family are being utilized in
the most effective way.30 In addition, guardians ad litem have certain
procedural rights, e.g., receiving notice of all hearings and having ac-
cess to the child’s records.31 In some states, appointed guardians ad
litem are actually recognized as a party to the proceedings, and ac-
cordingly, they can file pleadings and even examine witnesses.32 This,
of course, is especially true of attorney guardians ad litem.33
Michigan, a state with roughly twice the population of Wiscon-
sin,34 has long recognized the need of children to be “specially repre-
sented in legal matters involving them.” 35 This representation extends
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-304(b) (2012); ALASKA R. CINA P. 11(f); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-522(E) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f)(3) (West 2012); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1-208 (West 2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(c), tit. 31, § 3606 (West
2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.807(2)(b) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-9.1(d) (West
2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-16(c) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1633 (West
2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.12(2)(a)
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1507(3) (2011); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-830 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17d (West 2011); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260C.163(5)(b) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-8(1)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 453.025(4) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-205(2), 41-3-112(3) (West 2011);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.500(3) (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-1-7(E) (West
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 7B-601(a) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-
306(B)(3) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2(2) (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5334(b) (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.002(a), 107.003(1) (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-902(3) (West 2012); VT. R. FAM. P. 6(e); W. VA. R. CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT P. 52(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.235(3), 54.40(3) (West 2011).
31. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-522(F)-(G) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
316(f)(4) (West 2012).
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-304 (2012); ALASKA R. CINA P. 11; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19-1-111, 19-3-203 (West 2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 2302 (West 2012); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.401 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1634 (West 2012); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.112 (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1507 (2011); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 712A.17d (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.462 (West 2012); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-1-7 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-601 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10A, § 1-4-306 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2 (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5334 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-228 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.34.100 (West 2012).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9007A(b)(3) (West 2012).
34. According to United States census data, the population of Michigan in 2010 was
approximately 9,883,635, and the population of Wisconsin was approximately 5,686,986.
Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: STATE & COUNTRY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census
.gov/qfd/states/26000.html (last revised Mar. 14, 2013); Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU:
STATE & COUNTRY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html (last
revised Mar. 14, 2013).
35. Children’s Task Force, State Bar of Michigan, Guidelines for Advocates for Children
in Michigan Courts, http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/am_n/usa/michigan
/mich_guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). The report continues: “[T]he child needs
an independent advocate whose function, among others, is to help the child through the
difficult process. By definition, fundamental aspects of the child’s life are being threatened
in these legal proceedings. The child could lose mother, father, sister, brother, extended
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to the use of guardians ad litem.36 Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 3.915
governs the appointment of counsel for children in protective proceed-
ings and provides in pertinent part: “The court must appoint a lawyer-
guardian [ad litem] to represent the child at every hearing, including
the preliminary hearing. The child may not waive the assistance of
a lawyer-guardian [ad litem].” 37 Moreover, Section 10 of Michigan’s
Child Protection Law (CPL) expressly mandates: “In each case filed
under this act in which judicial proceedings are necessary, the court
shall appoint a lawyer-guardian [ad litem] to represent the child.” 38
Section 2 of the CPL defines “child” as “a person under 18 years
of age.” 39 Many other states have similar definitions of “child,” but
this legislation does not specify what “person” means for purposes
of providing legal representation for children who are abused or
neglected.40 Consequently, while it is clear that lawmakers intended
for courts to appoint guardians ad litem to represent children in all
child protective proceedings, it is less apparent whether these services
are limited only to born children. Many courts do afford legal protec-
tion to prenatal children under certain limited circumstances,41 but
family, school, or community. On the other hand, the child faces the prospect of harm at
the hands of an unfit caretaker, or of systemic indecision as to what ought to happen to
him or her.” See id.
36. Id. (“This representation not only requires the appointment of legal counsel, but
also extends to the use of guardians [ad litem], special advocates and other advisors to
the court.”).
37. MICH. CT. R. 3.915(B)(2)(A).
38. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 722.622(e).
40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-1 (2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 101(b) (West
2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(18) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9002A(4)
(West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(12) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(2) (West
2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602(7) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(10)
(West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-13(e) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(d)
(West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(8) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4002(2) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(e) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260C.007(4) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(4) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 43-245(7) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.0124 (West 2011); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(V) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2(b) (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7B-101(14) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(6) (West 2012);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(7) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 418.001 (West
2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2732 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-2(2) (West
2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(3) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(4)(A) (West
2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.003(a) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-105(6)
(West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(2)
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-2 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(iii)
(West 2011).
41. See, e.g., Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011) (holding that the state
Wrongful Death Act permits action for the death of a previable fetus); Commonwealth
v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the state may charge someone responsible
for the death of a prenatal child with criminal homicide); Meyer v. Burger King Corp.,
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it is not clear whether most state legislatures intended for the term
“child” to exclude prenatal children.
B. The Role of Guardians Ad Litem in Foreign Jurisdictions
Child advocates are also routinely appointed in foreign jurisdic-
tions, but their role is not always described with the term “guardian
ad litem.” For example, the functional equivalent of a guardian ad
litem in Scotland is the “safeguarder,” an appointed advocate who rep-
resents the best interest of the child during “children’s hearings.” 42
In Norway, the guardian ad litem acts as a spokesperson for the
child.43 The purpose of this spokesperson is to “attend to the child’s
interests in connection with the court action.” 44 In France, tempo-
rary guardians are appointed for children in all proceedings involv-
ing the termination of parental rights for the purpose of requesting
a permanent guardianship for the child.45 In Ireland, guardians are
appointed for infants in actions against them or on their behalf.46
In British Columbia, guardians are routinely appointed to oversee
minors’ estates.47 Courts situated in Ontario appoint legal represen-
tation for abused children in all cases involving potential termination
of parental rights.48 In Alberta, the Office of the Child and Youth
Advocate is permitted by statute to appoint lawyers to represent
children receiving services.49
The United Kingdom, too, has instituted a Children and Family
Court Advisory and Support Service (Service) that is quite similar
to the Office of Child and Youth Advocate located in Alberta.50 The
purpose of the Service is to “(a) safeguard and promote the welfare
of the children, (b) give advice to any court about any application
made to it in such proceedings, (c) make provision for the children
to be represented in such proceedings, [and] (d) provide information,
advice and other support for the children and their families.” 51
26 P.3d 925 (Wash. 2001) (holding that a parent may bring action for injuries suffered by
prenatal child).
42. Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act, 2011, (A.S.P. 1), § 3,¶ 30.
43. Act. No. 7, Apr. 8, 1981, ch. 7, § 61, “The Children Act” (Nor.).
44. Id.
45. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 380 (Fr.).
46. Circuit Court Rules 2001 (S.I. No. 510/2001) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/2001/en/si/0510.html.
47. Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46, art. 58 (Can.).
48. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, art. 38 (Can.).
49. Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-12, § 112 (Can.).
50. Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, 2000, c. 43, § 11 (Eng.).
51. Id.
522 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:511
Perhaps the most promising child welfare legislation abroad can
be found in Germany.52 There, children are provided with appointed
legal guardians if their parents are not entitled to represent them.53
A legal guardian will also be appointed if the child’s personal status
cannot be determined.54 Significantly, German law expressly recog-
nizes that “[i]f it is to be assumed that a child needs a guardian
upon birth, then even before the birth of the child a guardian may be
appointed; the appointment takes effect on the birth of the child.” 55
Germany is the only European country researched for this article
whose legislation makes any mention of appointing child advocates
for prenatal children, although such appointment does not actually
take effect until after the child is born.56
Several Latin American countries allow for the appointment of
guardians ad litem for unborn children for the purposes of property,
succession, or inheritance rights. Argentina and Honduras, for in-
stance, allow representation of unborn children by a guardian ad litem
in cases involving property or inheritance rights.57 Brazil also allows
for prenatal representation and grants preference to the biological
mother as a potential guardian ad litem.58 El Salvador allows either
the mother, both parents, or third parties to be appointed as guard-
ians ad litem for unborn children and places some limits on their
52. Children’s Rights: Germany, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/law/help
/child-rights/germany.php (last updated Jan. 25, 2013). The Library of Congress summa-
rizes that:
In Germany the parents are primarily responsible for raising their chil-
dren, yet governmental policy protects and supports children and youth in
various ways to promote their personal and social development and to as-
sure that they will find their place in the world when they are adults. These
goals are accomplished through protective legislation and various forms of
assistance. . . . Germany ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
in February 1992, and it became effective for Germany on April 5, 1992. How-
ever, when Germany deposited the ratification documents, it made inter-
pretative statements and reservations that show that Germany views the
Convention as a welcome development in international law that hopefully will
improve the situation of children worldwide, and that Germany will play its
part, in keeping with article 3 paragraph 2 of the Convention, by drafting
legislation to live up to the spirit of the Convention and to ensure the well-
being of the child.”
Id.
53. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL. I] 42, as amended, § 1773 (Ger.).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 1774 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 64 (Arg.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE]
arts. 414, 429 (Hon.).
58. Lei No. 5.869, de 11 de Janeiro de 1973, DÍARIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] (Braz.),
available at http://jusbrasil.com.br/legislacao/91735.
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authority.59 Colombia and Chile allow for guardians ad litem for
unborn children to be named in a will and permits their appointment
for inheritance and other purposes relating to property rights.60
C. The Rights of Prenatal Children Under International Law
Although many European countries utilize guardians ad litem
or their functional equivalents to protect born children from abuse
and neglect, it appears that none of these foreign jurisdictions ap-
point advocates to protect prenatal children. Moreover, although the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides that signato-
ries are to take appropriate measures to protect children from abuse
and neglect,61 the CRC has never been judicially interpreted to grant
rights to prenatal children, although some scholars have argued that
it should be.62
Among the numerous rights recognized by the CRC are freedom
of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom from
abuse and neglect, and freedom from cruel and inhuman punish-
ment or being imprisoned arbitrarily and without a fair trial.63 Not
unlike current child welfare legislation found in many states, the
CRC defines “child” as a person under eighteen years of age “unless
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” 64
The CRC further acknowledges that “every child has the inherent
right to life” and expressly directs states to “ensure to the maximum
extent possible the survival and development of the child.” 65
59. CÓDIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE] arts. 238, 486, 490 (El Sal.).
60. CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 433, 446 (Colom.); CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 343, 356 (Chile).
61. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 19, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (“States Parties shall take all appro-
priate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment,
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.”).
62. Dr. John I. Fleming & Dr. Michael G. Hains, What Rights, If Any, Do The Unborn
Have Under International Law?, 16 AUSTL. B. REV. 181, 198 (1997) (arguing that the born-
unborn distinction is an unjust, discriminatory distinction).
63. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 61, at arts. 13–15, 19, 37.
64. Id. at art. 1.
65. Id. at art. 6. But see Case of A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010). In this recent landmark decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
ruled that although the ECHR does not confer a right to obtain an abortion, Ireland vio-
lated Article 8 with regard to applicant C, a former cancer patient who travelled to
England for an abortion because it was unclear whether she could have access to an
abortion in a situation where she believed that her pregnancy was life threatening. Id.
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II. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR PRENATAL CHILDREN
A. Guardians Ad Litem Are Already Being Appointed for Prenatal
Children in Certain Legal Contexts
Many courts have already demonstrated a willingness to protect
prenatal children from neglect and abuse under certain limited cir-
cumstances, both by judicial decision and through guardian ad litem
representation.66 In addition to child protective proceedings, various
statutes expressly provide child advocacy for prenatal children for a
wide variety of other purposes.67 For example, nearly all state legis-
latures, as well as the District of Columbia, have adopted a specific
statutory provision permitting the appointment of guardians ad litem
for prenatal children in trust or probate proceedings.68 Some states
66. See, e.g., In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986) (holding that the
child abuse statute covers prenatal children); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C.
1997) (holding that a mother could be held guilty for child neglect for ingesting drugs
during pregnancy).
67. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(h) (West 2012) (providing for appoint-
ment in cases of illegal compensation for adoption); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 252 (2012)
(providing for appointment of a curator to protect the interests of a child unborn at the
time of its father’s death); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2045(1) (West 2012) (provid-
ing for appointment in cases other than probate in which the unborn child might have
an interest); MISS. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (providing for appointment any time an unborn child’s
interests are before the court); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 751(5) (West 2012) (providing
for appointment in cases in the orphan’s court); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.20(3), 48.203(7) (West
2011) (providing that if a pregnant minor or adult, respectively, is held in custody, the
unborn child’s guardian ad litem must be made aware of the location of her detention).
68. ALA. CODE § 19-3B-305 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.06.120 (West 2012); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1408 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-305 (West 2012); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 1003 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-10-403 (West 2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-132 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2905 (West 2012); D.C.
SUPERIOR CT. R. PROB. DIV. 209; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.303 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-6-173 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:1-403 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1-
403 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-1-20 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.6306
(West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2205 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 389A.035
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 1-403 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203E,
§ 305 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1403 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 501B.19, 524.1-403 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 472.300 (West 2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-1-303 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2222 (West 2011); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 155.140 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:3-305 (2011); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-1-403 (West 2012); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 315 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36C-3-305 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-03-03 (West 2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5803.05 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.120 (West 2012);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-22-17 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-715 (2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-32 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-305 (West 2011); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 115.014 (West 2011); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (West 2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-1-403 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 202 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-713 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.160 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 701.15 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-305 (West 2011); see also 735 ILL. COMP.
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also allow guardians ad litem to represent the property interests of
unborn children.69 In at least one known case, a judge ruled that a
prenatal child is a living person for purposes of recovering damages
after the wrongful death of a sibling.70 Moreover, some statutes actu-
ally mandate that prenatal children be treated as persons in cases in
which they have an interest.71
In addition to this abundance of cases involving the welfare of
prenatal children outside of the context of child protective proceed-
ings, some courts have even appointed guardians ad litem to repre-
sent the unborn in abortion proceedings.72 In fact, guardians ad litem
have been appointed for the general class of prenatal children in cases
challenging the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.73 Some
STAT. ANN. 5/2-501 (West 2011) (providing for appointment of guardians ad litem for per-
sons “not in being” in probate cases); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (West 2011) (providing
that an unborn child can inherit as if born).
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 30 (West 2012) (eminent domain cases); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 498-A:23 (2013) (eminent domain cases); N.C. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(4) (in rem, quasi
in rem, probate, and other cases affecting an interest in property); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 35A-1343 (West 2012) (administration of the unborn child’s estate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.131 (West 2011) (cases in which an unborn child has a future interest); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2012) (cases in which an unborn child has a property interest); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-94 (West 2012) (cases involving sale of real estate).
70. Fizer v. Davis (In re Estate of Davis), 706 So. 2d 244, 245 (Miss. 1998).
71. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-103 (West
2011).
72. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. 1998); In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d
355, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (lacking a discussion by the appellate court of the appropri-
ateness of the trial court’s appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus of a mentally
incompetent woman whose mother/guardian wanted to consent to her abortion); Helena
Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings
to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 87 (2001)
(“Including the first case of guardianship appointment, there have been at least 17 in-
stances in which minors, seeking to waive parental consent, have been questioned by an
appointed representative of the fetus.”). But see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem for a prenatal child carried by a juvenile who
was petitioning for an abortion without parental consent. Id. at 1189. The guardian ad
litem for the prenatal child appealed the granting of the minor’s petition. Id. The Florida
Supreme Court stated, “we find that the appointment of a guardian [ad litem] for the fetus
was clearly improper.” Id. at 1190; In re D.K., 497 A.2d 1298, 1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1985) (holding that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus of a schizophrenic
woman was inappropriate and that the guardian had no standing to bring an incompetency
petition before the court); In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d 145, 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding
that a person’s application to be the guardian ad litem for the non-viable fetus of a men-
tally incompetent woman whose husband was appointed her guardian to assent to her
abortion was properly denied because such a fetus was not a recognized person for the
purpose of such proceedings).
73. Larkin v. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 177, 179 (Mich. 1973) (contesting the constitu-
tionality of a law prohibiting abortion drugs in which guardians ad litem were permitted
to intervene; the Appeals Court said nothing about the permissibility of the guardians ad
litem being appointed). But see Benten v. Kessler, No. CV-92-3161(CPS), 1992 WL 266926,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1992) (refusing to allow the appointment of a guardian ad litem
for an unborn child in a proceeding challenging the illegality of RU486, an abortifacient).
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commentators have further argued that prenatal children must be
accorded full rights as a matter of constitutional law.74 In view of this
widespread existing legal precedent regarding advocacy for children
before they are born, there is already a sound framework established
to protect the rights of abused or neglected prenatal children outside
of the context of abortion.
B. Compelled Medical Treatment for Prenatal Children Against
Their Mothers’ Wishes
When should the legal status of a prenatal child be recognized
as being the same as that of a newborn infant? Not surprisingly, the
amount of legal protection afforded to prenatal children varies greatly
depending on the specific area of law. Likewise, judicial interpre-
tation of existing legislation may vary significantly based upon the
totality of circumstances surrounding a particular case. Even so, the
duty of parents to protect unborn babies developing in the womb con-
tinues to evolve.75 Many courts have compelled pregnant women to
submit to medical care, such as blood transfusions76 and cesarean
sections,77 to protect the health of their prenatal children.
74. Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being
Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. &
MED. 119, 198–99 (2006–2007) (reviewing the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the artificial personhood of corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment and
arguing that prenatal babies have a better claim to personhood under this jurisprudence
than corporations do).
75. Thomas W. Strahan, Legal Protection of the Unborn Child Outside the Context of
Induced Abortion, 11 ASS’N FOR INTERDISC. RES. VALUES & SOC. CHANGE 1, available at
http://lifeissues.net/writers/air/air_vol11no1_1997.html (“The duty of parents to protect
their children, in instances not involving induced abortion, has been applied to the care and
protection of unborn children in the womb. Cases of this type have occurred both before and
after the 1973 decision in [Roe v. Wade].”).
76. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J.
1964) (ordering a blood transfusion over the objections of the mother in the event that it
was necessary to save her life or the life of her unborn child); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d
140, 145 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961) (awarding custody to the county welfare depart-
ment for purposes of administering a blood transfusion); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d
898, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering a blood transfusion to protect the life of an 18-week-
old unborn child over the objections of the mother). But see, People v. Brown (In re Fetus
Brown), 689 N.E.2d 397, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“In conclusion, the circuit court erred in
appointing a temporary custodian for Fetus Brown with the authority to consent to blood
transfusions for Darlene Brown and erred in appointing the public guardian as guardian
ad litem for Fetus Brown.”).
77. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251
(N.D. Fl. 1999) (holding that the State’s interest in protecting the unborn child’s life super-
seded the mother’s right to refuse a cesarean section); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty.
Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458, 460 (Ga. 1981) (authorizing the county hospital to per-
form a cesarean section on the mother of a 39-week-old unborn child in the event she pre-
sented herself to the hospital); but see People v. Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe), 632 N.E.2d 326,
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Not surprisingly, however, court orders regarding compelled med-
ical care routinely become the subject of bitter, prolonged litigation.
One such case in which an appellate court refused to uphold an order
requiring a pregnant woman to submit to medical treatment for the
sake of her unborn child was recently decided in Florida.78 In that
case, a circuit court order compelling a pregnant woman to submit to
hospitalization, intravenous medication, and anticipated surgical de-
livery was overturned even after the controversy between the parties
became moot by the unborn child’s death mere days after the order
was entered.79 In so ruling, the appellate court reasoned: “Only after
the threshold determination of viability has been made may the court
weigh the state’s compelling interest to preserve the life of the fetus
against the patient’s fundamental constitutional right to refuse med-
ical treatment.” 80 Significantly, however, the ruling in this case did
not declare that the government lacks a compelling interest to protect
a prenatal child at all stages of pregnancy; rather, the requisite bal-
ancing test only applies to viable prenatal children.81 Thus, once a pre-
natal child is deemed viable, the State may take legal action to protect
his or her health.82
The legitimacy of this concept was recognized in an amicus brief
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union over two decades ago,
which included a report prepared by the American Medical Association
discussing the propriety of judicial intervention to protect the welfare
of prenatal children:
If an exceptional circumstance could be found in which a
medical treatment poses an insignificant—or no—health risk to
the woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity,
326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[W]e hold that . . . a woman’s competent choice to refuse medical
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during pregnancy must be honored, even in
circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.”).
78. Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
79. Id. at 264.
80. Id. at 266.
81. Id. at 265.
82. See Carrie Ann Wozniak, Comment, Difficult Problems Call for New Solutions: Are
Guardians Proper for Viable Fetuses of Mentally Incompetent Mothers in State Custody?,
34 STETSON L. REV. 193, 226 (2004). Wozniak explains:
To avoid undue infringement of the mother’s right to privacy, viability is the
logical point at which a court should appoint a guardian for a fetus in a situ-
ation [where a mentally incompetent woman is pregnant]. One could argue
that the state has a compelling interest in the fetus’s health before viability
because Roe and Casey discuss only the state’s compelling interest in fetal
life; there is no mention of fetal health. Therefore, it would be allowable for
a court to appoint a guardian for a fetus as soon as the mother’s pregnancy is
apparent, even if this is before viability, to ensure the fetus’s health.
Id.
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and would clearly prevent substantial and irreversible harm to
her fetus, it might be appropriate for a physician to seek judicial
intervention. However, the fundamental principle against com-
pelled medical procedures should be a control in all cases that do
not present such exceptional circumstances.83
Indeed, numerous courts have required pregnant women to submit
to medical procedures against their wishes to save their unborn chil-
dren when the mother will also benefit from the procedure or if the
risk of harm to their own health is minimal. One such court order was
fiercely litigated in Florida after an expectant mother left the hospital
against medical advice and was thereafter forced to return against
her will.84
In the case of Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Med-
ical Center, Inc., a pregnant woman was ultimately forced to have
a cesarean section after multiple physicians concluded that vaginal
birth posed “a substantial and unacceptable risk of death” to her
child.85 Notably, Ms. Pemberton had delivered her previous baby by
cesarean section in 1995.86 When Ms. Pemberton became pregnant
again in 1996, she was unable to find a physician who would allow
her to deliver vaginally; consequently, she attempted to deliver her
baby at home, unattended by any physician and “without any backup
arrangement with a hospital.” 87 After more than a day of grueling
labor, Ms. Pemberton decided to go to the emergency room to re-
quest intravenous fluids.88 A board-certified physician advised Ms.
Pemberton that she needed to have a cesarean section, but she ada-
mantly refused and “left the hospital against medical advice, appar-
ently surreptitiously.” 89 The hospital called an attorney, who in turn
contacted the State Attorney, at which time a special assistant was
deputized to handle the legal controversy.90
83. Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264
JAMA 2663, 2666 (Nov. 28, 1990) [hereinafter Legal Interventions] (emphasis added).
84. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247, 1250
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
85. Id. at 1250 n.2. The physicians concluded that without a cesarean section, the viable
fetus would die, and that it was “absolutely necessary as a lifesaving procedure to perform
a C-Section on the patient.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court determined
that, based on “uncontested testimony in the record,” this was an “exaggeration.” Id.
86. Id. at 1249.
87. Id.
88. Id. (“[S]he had been unable to hold down food or liquids and was becoming dehy-
drated. She went with her husband, plaintiff Kent Pemberton, to the emergency room . . .
where she requested an IV.”).
89. Id.
90. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249–50.
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Shortly thereafter, a judge visited the hospital to conduct an
emergency hearing and multiple doctors testified “that vaginal birth
would pose a substantial risk of uterine rupture and resulting death
of the baby.” 91 After ordering Ms. Pemberton to return to the hospi-
tal, the judge continued the hearing in her room and afforded both
Ms. Pemberton and her husband an opportunity to express their per-
sonal views.92 At the conclusion of the proceeding, the judge ordered
that an emergency cesarean section be performed and Ms. Pemberton
delivered a healthy baby boy with no complications.93
After the surgery, Ms. Pemberton filed a lawsuit against the
hospital alleging various constitutional violations:
She asserts a right to bodily integrity, a right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, and a right to make important personal and
family decisions regarding the bearing of children without undue
governmental interference. She also invokes her right to religious
freedom, although she does not specifically delineate the belief she
says was violated or specifically identify its religious mooring.94
In granting the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, the district
court judge concluded that the compelled medical procedure did not
violate Ms. Pemberton’s constitutional rights and eloquently reasoned:
Medicine is not an exact science. The physicians who, on the
night at issue, rendered opinions regarding the risk Ms. Pemberton
faced from vaginal delivery did not and could not know with cer-
tainty whether that risk would be realized in her case. Similarly,
the hospital, state attorney and state court who relied on the
physicians’ opinions could not know with certainty the outcome
Ms. Pemberton would encounter. In anything other than an ex-
traordinary and overwhelming case, the right to decide would
surely rest with the mother, not with the state. But based on the
evidence disclosed by this record, this was an extraordinary and
overwhelming case; no reasonable or even unreasonable argument
could be made in favor of vaginal delivery at home with the atten-
dant risk of death to the baby (and concomitant grave risk to the
mother). On the clear and uncontradicted evidence, the interests
of the baby required a cesarean section.95
91. Id. at 1250.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1251.
95. Id. at 1254.
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In so ruling, the judge specifically distinguished In re A.C.,96 a momen-
tous en banc decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
in a footnote:
This case is . . . markedly different from In re A.C., in which the
court held that a cesarean could not properly be ordered for a
terminally ill woman in her 26th week of pregnancy whose death
would be hastened by the performance of the proposed cesarean.
In re A.C. left open the possibility that a non-consenting patient’s
interest would yield to a more compelling countervailing interest
in an “extremely rare and truly exceptional” case. The case at bar
is such a case.97
These cases represent only two of the many contentious child
welfare decisions to unfold in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade in which
the personal preferences of an expectant mother were weighed against
the adverse interests of her unborn child. Thus, there are definitely
situations in which the government, acting as parens patriae, may
properly intervene to protect the life of prenatal children, even when
doing so runs counter to the wishes of their parents. When pregnant
women are unwilling or unable to properly care for their own, guard-
ian ad litem representation is an effective judicial tool to ensure that
the needs of prenatal children are considered.
C. Legal Prohibitions Against Harming Prenatal Children
Outside the Context of Abortion
There are at least four different categories of cases involving
harm to prenatal children: (1) criminal cases in which third parties
harm pregnant women; (2) civil actions against third parties who
harm pregnant women; (3) civil cases in which pregnant women are
accused of harming their own prenatal children, either in a lawsuit
to recover damages or in a dependency action to terminate parental
rights; and (4) criminal cases in which pregnant women are charged
with harming their children before they are born.
96. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
97. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1254 n.18 (citations omitted). The circumstances
surrounding the case of In re A.C. presented the issue of whether cesarean delivery could
be court-ordered when the pregnant woman was unconscious, mere hours from death, and
her wishes were in doubt. In re A.C., 573 A.2d. at 1237. Sadly, both the prenatal child
and the mother died before the case was decided. Id. at 1238. Notably, in earlier proceed-
ings, a guardian ad litem had been appointed for the prenatal child and the District of
Columbia had appeared in a parens patriae capacity. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C.
1987), vacated by In re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
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1. Criminal Prosecution of Third Parties Who Harm
Prenatal Children
Many jurisdictions have passed legislation to increase criminal
penalties for violent acts committed against pregnant women.98 In fact,
at least thirty-eight states currently have “feticide” statutes criminal-
izing the killing of prenatal children outside the context of abortion.99
In Michigan, for example, Michigan Compiled Laws (MCL) § 750.90a
punishes an individual for causing a miscarriage or stillbirth with
malicious intent toward the fetus or embryo.100 Significantly, a viola-
tion of this statute is punishable by life imprisonment.101 Many states
have adopted similar provisions by either classifying feticide as a
separate crime or defining “person” in their criminal code to include
the unborn, although not every homicide statute covers all stages of
development.102 Moreover, some courts have interpreted “person”
98. Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www
.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 2013).
99. Id. (“The states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
At least 23 states have fetal homicide laws that apply to the earliest stages of pregnancy
(‘any state of gestation,’ ‘conception,’ ‘fertilization’ or ‘post-fertilization’)[.]”) (emphasis
omitted); see also State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) (“[F]etal homicide
statutes seek to protect the ‘potentiality of human life,’ and they do so without impinging
directly or indirectly on a pregnant woman’s privacy rights.”); Joanne Pedone, Filling
the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77,
87–88 (2009).
100. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.90a (West 2012) (“If a person intentionally commits
conduct proscribed . . . against a pregnant individual, the person is guilty of a felony . . .
if all of the following apply: (a) The person intended to cause a miscarriage or stillbirth
by that individual or death or great bodily harm to the embryo or fetus, or acted in wan-
ton or willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the person’s conduct
is to cause a miscarriage or stillbirth or death or great bodily harm to the embryo or fetus.
(b) The person’s conduct resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual or death
to the embryo or fetus.”); see also id. § 750.90b (punishing an individual for harming or kill-
ing a fetus or embryo during an intentional assault against a pregnant woman without
regard to the individual’s intent or recklessness toward the fetus or embryo); id. § 750.90c
(punishing an individual for harming or killing a fetus or embryo during a grossly negli-
gent act against a pregnant woman without regard to the individual’s state of mind toward
the fetus or embryo).
101. Id. § 750.90a (West 2012). Michigan passed a constitutional ban on the death pen-
alty in 1963, leaving life imprisonment as the highest form of punishment in the state.
Michigan, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/michigan-0 (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
102. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.150 (West 2012); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(1) (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2012); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-502 (West 2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West 2012); IND. CODE
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and “child” in existing legislation to include unborn children.103 In
all, twenty-seven states currently have homicide laws that recognize
prenatal children as victims throughout the entire period of prenatal
development, and nine additional states have homicide laws that rec-
ognize prenatal children as victims during a portion of their develop-
ment in the womb.104
Indeed, there does appear to be a trend in the law to protect non-
viable unborn children.105 In enacting the Fetal Protection Act, for
example, the Michigan legislature used the term “embryo” as well as
the term “fetus” in describing the prohibited conduct, thereby demon-
strating its intent to provide criminal penalties for harm caused to
all prenatal children.106 As the Court of Appeals expressly declared
in People v. Kurr: “The plain language . . . shows the Legislature’s
ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.7, 707.8 (West 2012); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.020 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2012); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21(1a) (West 2012); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-37 (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-388 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.210 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-17.1-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 691(B) (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2601 (West 2012); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1.1 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-214 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2
(West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-30 (West 2011); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-
201(a) (2011) (battery includes harming a fetus); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West
2011) (providing exceptions to the inclusion of unborn children in the homicide provisions);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2012) (criminalizing abortions committed by a third
party). But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-101 (West 2012) (defining “person” for pur-
poses of homicide as someone born); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-700 (West 2012) (defining
“person” for purposes of homicide as someone born); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.005 (West
2012) (defining “human being” as including only those born and alive).
103. E.g., State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328, 331 (S.C. 1998) (holding that the words “person”
and “child” in South Carolina’s homicide statute applied to viable fetuses both for the
purpose of criminal charges and as an aggravating circumstance), overruled in part on
other grounds by State v. Shafer, 531 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. 2000), as recognized in Humphries
v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160, n.8 (S.C. 2002).
104. State Homicide Laws That Recognize Unborn Victims, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM.
(July 5, 2012), http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn_Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html.
105. Strahan, supra note 75 (“There is a clear trend to include non-viable unborn
children in the interpretation of criminal law and wrongful death statutes.”); see also
People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994) (In Bank) (holding that the legislature
may constitutionally criminalize the murder of a prenatal infant without imposing a
viability requirement); Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Ga. 1984) (upholding a con-
viction for killing an unborn baby, noting that medical experts do not know a definite time
when the movement of an unborn child is possible); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 323
(Minn. 1990) (upholding an indictment for first and second degree murder of a 27 to 28-
day-old embryo).
106. People v. Kurr, 654 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“Black’s Law
Dictionary . . . defines ‘embryo’ as ‘[a] developing but unborn or unhatched animal; esp.,
an unborn human from conception until the development of organs (i.e., until about the
eighth week of pregnancy).’ This definition clearly encompasses non-viable fetuses.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
2013] A CHILD NEEDS A CHAMPION 533
conclusion that fetuses are worthy of protection as living entities as a
matter of public policy.”107 This ruling is of immense importance be-
cause it permits a pregnant woman to use deadly force to protect her
prenatal child from attack, even if her own life is not in danger.108
In that particular criminal case, the defendant, a pregnant
woman named Jaclyn Kurr, and her boyfriend were arguing over
her cocaine use and he punched her in the stomach two times.109 Ms.
Kurr warned her boyfriend not to hit her because she was pregnant
with his babies.110 When he approached her once again, she stabbed
him in the chest.111 Antonio Pena died as a result of the stab wound
and Ms. Kurr was sentenced to serve five to twenty years in prison.112
The precise issue on appeal was whether the “defense of others”
concept should be extended to protect a prenatal child, viable or
non-viable, from an assault on the pregnant woman.113 The Court of
Appeals held that a pregnant woman may use deadly force “if she
honestly and reasonably believes the fetus to be in danger of immi-
nent death or great bodily harm” and in so ruling, reasoned:
We emphasize that our decision today is a narrow one. We
are obviously aware of the raging debate occurring in this coun-
try regarding the point at which a fetus becomes a person entitled
to all the protections of the state and federal constitutions. This
issue, however, is not raised by the parties, is not pertinent to
the resolution of the instant case, and does not drive our ruling
today. . . . We conclude that an individual may indeed defend a
fetus from such an assault and may even use deadly force if she
honestly and reasonably believes the fetus to be in danger of
imminent death or great bodily harm. Any other result would be
anomalous, given the express policy of this state as declared by the
Legislature in the fetal protection act.114
Despite the fact that the appellate court refused to address the issue
of whether a prenatal child is a person “entitled to all the protections
of the state and federal constitutions,”115 recognition that an unborn
107. Id.
108. Id. at 655.
109. Id. at 652.
110. Id. “[The d]efendant told a Kalamazoo police officer that she had been carrying
quadruplets at the time of the stabbing.” Id. at 652 n.1.
111. Id. at 652.
112. Kurr, 654 N.W.2d at 652.
113. Id. at 653 (“Defendant now argues that because the trial court did not instruct the
jury on the defense of others theory, she was denied her constitutional right to present
a defense.”).
114. Id. at 657 (second emphasis added).
115. Id.
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child is a living human being entitled to legal protection is implicit
in the Kurr decision. After all, the “defense of others” theory does
not apply to using deadly force to protect animals or plants.116
The most significant, and arguably the most controversial,117 ex-
pansion of rights for prenatal children occurred at the federal level.
In 2004, former President George W. Bush signed into law the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act (UVVA)118 which makes it a separate federal
offense to kill or injure a “child in utero” while committing certain
crimes.119 The UVVA makes such offenses punishable if the prohibited
act harmed the mother but requires no proof that the perpetrator
intended to cause harm to the prenatal child or even had knowledge
that the mother was pregnant.120
However, the UVVA limits its own application such that the gov-
ernment may not prosecute the following individuals: a person for
abortion-related conduct to which the mother consented; a person for
medical treatment of the mother or child; or a woman with respect to
her own child.121 Notably, the UVVA is the very first federal law to
recognize a fertilized egg as a crime “victim,” independent of the preg-
nant woman who has been harmed.122 Under the UVVA, “unborn
child” is defined as “a child in utero,” which is itself defined as “a
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who
is carried in the womb.”123 The UVVA prohibits the deliberate mur-
der of such children and penalizes the crime with the same penalty
that applies to first-degree murder: “by death or by imprisonment
116. Patrick Johnston, Michigan Court Rules Fetus Can Be Defended with Lethal Force,
CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV., http://www.christiangallery.com/justifiablehomicide
.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“I cannot employ lethal force against someone who wants
to cut my grass without my permission. However, I can employ lethal force against some-
one who wants to kill my preborn baby without permission.”).
117. See 147 CONG. REC. 6325 (2001) (statement of Rep. Betty McCollum) (urging oppo-
sition to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act and alleging that it is part of a concerted
campaign to undermine Roe v. Wade; that it does not protect women from violence; and
that it fails to recognize that injury to a pregnancy is first and foremost an injury to a
of Violence Act of 2003 (S. woman); Interested Persons Memo on Attempts to Create Fetal
Rights: The Unborn Victims 1019, S. 146, H.R. 1997), ACLU (June 17, 2003) http://www
.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/interested-persons-memo-attempts-create-fetal-rights
-unborn-victims-violence-ac (“The ACLU fully supports efforts to punish acts of violence
against women that harm or terminate a wanted pregnancy. The Unborn Victims of Vio-
lence Act is an inappropriate method of imposing such punishment, however, because
it dangerously seeks to separate the woman from her fetus in the eyes of the law.”).
118. Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006) and 10
U.S.C. § 919a (2006)).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
120. Id. § 1841(a)(2).
121. Id. § 1841(c).
122. LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, FETAL RIGHTS (2008), available at http://lsrj
.org/documents/factsheets/08-09_Fetal_Rights.pdf.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d).
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for life.”124 The unborn child’s mother is exempted from prosecution,
as is any abortionist who has the mother’s consent.125
There is no question that this federal legislation has sparked new
debate over the issue of when a prenatal child is entitled to legal pro-
tection, as well as the implications of such criminal penalties in other
areas of law. Those supportive of a prenatal child’s civil rights value
the UVVA as recognizing that unborn children are entitled to legal
protection.126 In stark contrast, however, the pro-abortion127 lobby
fiercely opposes the UVVA on the ground that it supposedly elevates
the legal status of a prenatal child to that of an adult.128 But the UVVA
has no direct bearing on an expectant mother’s “right to choose.”129
124. Id. § 1841(a), 1111(b).
125. Id. § 1841(c); see also Ken Blackwell, The 14th Victim at Fort Hood, AM. THINKER
(July 29, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/07/the_14th_victim_at_fort_hood
.html (“Now, I want to focus on something Mr. Obama is not doing. He is not charging
Nidal Hasan, the accused Fort Hood killer, with violation of the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act (UVVA). . . . There would seem to be no possibility of controversy in charging Hasan
with violating the UVVA. After all, it is indisputable that one of those killed was pregnant
at the time of her death. Nor did the mother, Army Private Francheska Velez, contemplate
an abortion. There would be no question of her exercising ‘choice’ in this matter. In fact,
her last words, most poignantly reported, were: ‘My baby! my baby!’ It was for just such
heinous crimes that the UVVA was passed.”).
126. See Adam C. Kolasinski, Op-Ed., Untenable Unborn Child Dichotomy, TECH,
Apr. 2, 2004, at 5, available at http://www-tech.mit.edu/V124/N16/kolasinski.16c.html
(“Predictably, the anti-abortion lobby has come out strongly in favor of the act. The case
against abortion rests exclusively on the notion that the unborn child is a human being
who deserves the full protection of the law.”).
127. “Pro-abortion” is used here in preference to “abortion-rights” or “pro-choice” or
“women’s rights” because the latter are less precise or inaccurate in describing what they
purport to describe. See Kolasinski, supra note 126, at 5. The “rights” involved are of
dubious constitutional basis. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, YALE L.
SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES (2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=fss_papers. They do not consider the “rights”
of the person whose life is to be taken in an abortion. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation
of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and
Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 599 (1986). The “choice” essential to “pro-choice” rhet-
oric is the choice to kill the prenatal child, not the choice to have the baby, nor the choice
to get pregnant in the first place. See Seth F. Kreimer, Essay, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-
Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 813
(1995). The rights of women are ignored to the extent that nearly half the babies killed
are female. See Gender Preference in the United States, INGENDER.COM, http://in-gender
.com/XYU/Gender-Preference (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (noting that worldwide, 42%
of female fetuses are aborted, compared with 25% of male fetuses).
128. Kolasinski, supra note 126, at 5 (“To quote Kate Michelman, president of NARAL,
‘The dangerous reality of the bill . . . is that it would elevate the legal status of the fetus to
that of an adult human being.’ She’s actually wrong. The bill would elevate the legal status
of an unborn child to that of a baby, but only in certain circumstances. It does not give
unborn babies the right to vote or drink.” (citations omitted)).
129. Id. (“The act has no direct bearing whatsoever on reproductive freedom, privacy
rights, women’s rights, or anything else that abortion rights supporters use to argue
their case. It merely grants legal protection to unborn babies in instances where they are
attacked against their mother’s will.”).
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In arguing against the UVVA, abortion advocates attempt to cloak
their underlying premise: that prenatal children deserve no legal pro-
tection.130 Although the UVVA does appear to place prenatal children
in a category akin to property, insofar as the “owner” (i.e., the mother)
can allow another person to destroy her prenatal child,131 a third party
may only do so with her consent.132 Helpful, of course, is the fact that
the UVVA refers to the victims protected as “children.”133
2. Civil Penalties for Third Parties Who Harm
Prenatal Children
Courts have generally been receptive to civil law claims by chil-
dren for harm suffered in utero as the result of negligence by third
parties.134 Every state currently recognizes prenatal harm as a cause
of action if the child is subsequently born alive.135 In Colorado, for
example, a district court judge has expressly ruled that a wrongful
death action can be maintained for the death of a viable unborn child:
A full-term, viable unborn child’s right to be born alive is entitled to
as much protection under the Colorado Wrongful Death Statute as
a newborn child’s right to live. If, as the result of tortious injury
to a mother bearing viable twins, one were born alive with fatal
injuries caused by the tortfeasor, but the other was killed before
birth, the law should recognize a tort remedy for each death. To
the extent that modern medical developments have established
that a fetus, once it has attained a certain stage of development
is able to survive outside the mother’s womb, reasoning based on
contrary medical views of earlier times is no longer relevant.136
130. Id. (“In arguing against the unborn victims act, however, the abortion rights lobby
cannot avoid exposing the premise underlying their position, which they normally take
pains to hide. . . . By fighting this bill so vociferously, abortion rights advocates reveal
that the basis of their position is nothing more than the notion that an unborn baby has
no rights. . . . [T]heir reluctance to make th[is] notion . . . the centerpiece of their case for
abortion indicates that they are afraid to directly confront the public with it. Their fears
seem well-founded. As the science of fetology progresses, the humanity of an unborn child
becomes more apparent. In an age where a first trimester sonogram is a child’s first pic-
ture in the family album, I suspect that when forced to confront the question of whether
unborn children deserve legal protection, most Americans will answer ‘yes.’ ”).
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2006).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1841.
134. Strahan, supra note 75. Strahan also points out that “[a]t common law no recovery
for prenatal injury was recognized and this was the law in the United States.” Id.
135. See 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 107 (Miss. 2003) (“Recovery
for prenatal injuries when a child is born alive is permitted in every jurisdiction in the
country.”).
136. Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, Illinois courts have recognized a prenatal child’s “right
to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach
of duty to the child’s mother.”137 In one such case, the Supreme Court
of Illinois ruled that an infant could maintain a negligence action
against a hospital and physician for injuries sustained after the
mother was transfused with incompatible blood several years prior
to the child’s conception.138 In so holding, the appellate court specifi-
cally noted that it would be illogical “to bar relief for an act done prior
to conception where the defendant would be liable for this same
conduct had the child, unbeknownst to him, been conceived prior to
his act.”139
An appellate court in Texas has even ruled that providing illegal
drugs to a pregnant woman “is clear and convincing evidence of con-
duct endangering the physical well-being of a child” for purposes of
terminating a parent-child relationship.140 In that case, a newborn
infant, U.P., was taken into protective custody after she was born ad-
dicted to cocaine and barbiturates.141 Two weeks after U.P.’s birth,
her father “was arrested for, and ultimately convicted of, the manufac-
ture and delivery of cocaine.”142 The Texas Department of Protective
and Regulatory Services immediately filed a petition to terminate his
parental rights and during the trial, a pediatrician testified that U.P.
was “likely to suffer from developmental delays, emotional instability,
and attention deficit disorder (ADD) for life.”143 U.P.’s father denied
supplying crack cocaine to the child’s mother after learning of her
pregnancy but ultimately conceded that “the actions of U.P.’s mother,
combined with his own inaction, placed the child in grave danger.”144
Despite these and other auspicious rulings across the nation,
some courts simply refuse to hear legal claims brought by the unborn
on the ground that these particular children are not “persons” under
the U.S. Constitution.145 However, five Justices of the Supreme Court
137. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977).
138. Id. at 1251.
139. Id. at 1255.
140. In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
141. Id. at 225 (“During her short life, the child has suffered from numerous medical
problems, including intrauterine growth retardation, an umbilical hernia, sleep apnea
or Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), reflux, reactive airway disease, a crossed eye,
and severe developmental delays. She was premature at birth and had below average
birth weight. She has undergone surgery without the benefit of anesthetics because of
her cocaine addiction.”).
142. Id. at 226.
143. Id. at 225.
144. Id. at 226.
145. See, e.g., Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 798–99 (W.D. Va. 1981) (holding
that an infant child has no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of the Constitution
for damage caused in utero by police officer striking mother in the stomach before she was
born); Romero v. Gonzalez Caraballo, 681 F. Supp. 123, 125–26 (D.P.R. 1988) (refusing to
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of Alabama have recently pointed out that personhood in the context
of Roe v. Wade is not the end of the inquiry:
Roe’s statement that unborn children are not “persons” within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant to the
question whether unborn children are “persons” under state law.
Because the Fourteenth Amendment “right” recognized in Roe is
not implicated unless state action violates a woman’s “right” to end
a pregnancy, the other parts of the superstructure of Roe, including
the viability standard, are not controlling outside abortion law.146
In that particular case, the unanimous Supreme Court of Alabama
held that a mother could recover in a wrongful death action against
negligent medical doctors for the pre-viability death of her son.147 In
so ruling, the appellate court relied on familiar language from the
U.S. Declaration of Independence which is also found in the Ala-
bama Constitution:
[T]he Declaration of Rights in the Alabama Constitution . . .
states that “all men are equally free and independent; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”
These words . . . affirm that each person has a God-given right
to life.148
In the special concurrence, the Supreme Court of Alabama also
specifically discussed the viability standard established by Roe v.
Wade in appreciable depth, concluding:
Roe’s viability rule was based on inaccurate history and was
mostly unsupported by legal precedent. Medical advances since
Roe have conclusively demonstrated that an unborn child is a
unique human being at every stage of development. And together,
Alabama’s homicide statute, the decisions of this Court, and the
statutes and judicial decisions from other states make abun-
dantly clear that the law is no longer, in Justice Blackmun’s
words, “reluctant . . . to accord legal rights to the unborn.” For
these reasons, Roe’s viability rule is neither controlling nor per-
suasive here and should be rejected by other states until the day
it is overruled by the United States Supreme Court.149
allow for a claim by a fetus for violations of constitutional rights caused by police brutality
and ruling that a fetus is not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment).
146. Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 741 (Ala. 2012) (Parker, J., Stuart, J., Bolin, J.,
and Wise, J., concurring specially).
147. Id. at 735.
148. Id. at 734 n.4 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 747 (Parker, J., Stuart, J., Bolin, J., and Wise, J., concurring specially).
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Although many states have retained “viability” as a requirement to
recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child,150 viability as cri-
teria for recovery has been sharply criticized.151 Indeed, several states
have already enacted legislation permitting wrongful death actions
prior to viability and numerous courts have upheld such provisions
on the ground that all children have a right “to begin life with a sound
mind and body.”152
3. Civil Actions Against Mothers Who Harm Their
Prenatal Children
Third parties are not the only defendants who may be subject to
civil liability and criminal penalties if a child is harmed in the womb.
Several states have enacted statutes which allow a pregnant woman
to be deemed negligent if her unborn child tests positive for drugs
after birth.153 Moreover, lawmakers in South Dakota have passed
150. E.g., Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Idaho’s
wrongful death statute does not apply to non-viable fetuses); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d
100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (allowing a wrongful death action for a child who was “quick”
in the womb); Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510, 512 (Ill. 1991) (holding that there was a
rebuttable presumption that there was a loss of society after the wrongful death of a viable
fetus); 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 114 (Miss. 2003) (“Following the ex-
ample of the Supreme Court of Georgia and looking to our own Legislature’s reasoning in
this area, we adopt the standard as found in our criminal statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-3,
which will permit recovery for the death of a child that is ‘quick’ in the womb.”).
151. Strahan, supra note 75.
152. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971) (“[J]ustice requires that
the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and
body.” (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960))); see, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 1.205 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(F)(1) (West 2012); Connor v. Monkem
Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995) (holding that the unborn child was a “person” for
purposes of the state wrongful death statute despite the fact that the child was non-viable);
Pino v. United States, 183 P.3d 1001, 1006 (Okla. 2008) (holding that a wrongful death
action could be maintained for a non-viable fetus under Oklahoma law); Presley v. Newport
Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 754 (R.I. 1976) (disregarding the issue of viability for the purpose of
determining recovery under Rhode Island’s Wrongful Death Act); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf
Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D. 1996) (holding that a wrongful death action for fetus
could be upheld regardless of whether the fetus was viable); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d
522, 534 (W.Va. 1995) (holding that the term “person,” as used in the wrongful death
statutes, includes a non-viable unborn child). But see, Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 302
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that parents of a fetus not born alive were not able to re-
cover under the wrongful death statute); LaDu v. Oregon Clinic, P.C., 998 P.2d 733, 738
(Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) (holding that Oregon’s wrongful death statute does not apply
to non-viable fetuses).
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(13)(B)(i)(a) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-
3-102(1)(g) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-34-1-10(1)(B) (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(6) (West 2012); LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(22) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (West
2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(R) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(am), (ap)
(West 2011).
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legislation allowing for pregnant women who abuse drugs or alcohol
to be involuntarily committed to a treatment facility.154 In New Jersey,
a private citizen can even petition a judge on behalf of a prenatal
child if he or she suspects that the baby is being abused or neglected.155
In several jurisdictions, medical professionals are specifically required
by law to make a report to various government agencies if a new-
born infant tests positive for alcohol or drugs.156
On the other hand, some states have expressly excluded pre-
natal children from the definition of a “child” or “juvenile” in need
of services.157 Not surprisingly, however, judicial officers working in
states that do not explicitly include or exclude unborn children from
their statutes have been wholly inconsistent in resolving the issue
of whether a prenatal child qualifies as a “child” for purposes of child
protective proceedings.158 As a result, courts have adopted different
154. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 (2012) (“An intoxicated person who . . . [i]s preg-
nant and abusing alcohol or drugs[ ] may be committed to an approved treatment facility
for emergency treatment.”).
155. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 2012) (providing that when it appears that a
child’s safety or welfare is endangered, any person or organization having a special in-
terest in the child may petition the State to provide care or custody as the circumstances
may require). The provisions of the statute “shall be deemed to include an application on
behalf of an unborn child when the prospective mother is within th[e] State at the time
of application . . . .” Id.
156. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.024(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.175
(West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 610(G) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623a
(West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(3)
(2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-25.1-16(1) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-
101(B)(2) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509(A) (West 2012).
157. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(32) (West 2012) (“ ‘Juvenile’ means an individ-
ual who is: (A) From birth to eighteen (18) years of age, whether married or single[.]”);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587A-4 (West 2012) (“ ‘Child’ means a person who is born alive and
is less than eighteen years of age.”).
158. In re Nathaniel A., 864 A.2d 1066, 1071 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (approving a trial
court’s classification of an unborn child as a child in need of assistance); In re Unborn
Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 370–71 (Fam. Ct. 1998) (holding that unborn children are pro-
tected under the Family Court Act and exposing a child to illegal drugs in utero is con-
duct sufficient to show neglect); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 335 (Fam. Ct. 1985)
(holding that a prenatal child fell within the family court act’s jurisdictional definition
of a “person”); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1986) (holding that be-
cause the child abuse statute included a viable unborn fetus the state has an interest in the
child’s well-being at viability); In re Lacey P., 433 S.E.2d 518, 524 n.5 (W. Va. 1993) (stat-
ing that an unborn child could be placed in protective custody, which in practice means the
State would take custody once the child was born). But see In re Appeal in Pima Cnty.
Juvenile Severance Action No. S-120171, 905 P.2d 555, 558 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that unborn children are not included in the definition of “child” for purposes of terminating
parental rights); In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a de-
pendency petition cannot be sustained for a prenatal child); In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr.
525, 528 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the legislature did not intend for the term “person”
to include an unborn child); Wixtrom v. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re Guardianship
of J.D.S.), 864 So. 2d 534, 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he Legislature has not yet
addressed the rights, if any, of the unborn, and when, if at all, a fetus acquires personhood,
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approaches to determine whether a mother can be held liable for
negligently harming her own unborn child.
It is not uncommon for courts to find that drug abuse by expec-
tant mothers constitutes abuse or neglect under existing child wel-
fare legislation. For example, an appellate court in New York held
that a child born with cocaine in his or her system is prima facie evi-
dence of neglect, even in the absence of proof that the pregnant woman
struggled with drug addiction during pregnancy or was otherwise neg-
ligent after her child’s birth.159 In that case, the mother’s unfounded
reliance on Roe v. Wade was summarily rejected.160 In so ruling, the
appellate court discussed why the existing state legislation should
be interpreted to protect unborn children:
It has been stated that “[t]he important state interests in
preservation of life, the potentiality of life, and child welfare lend
resolute support to the argument that child abuse and neglect
statutes should include unborn children. In reality, this is the
only way to give meaningful effect to those interests. An interest
stripped of a method of enforcement is a feckless thing. Nowhere
in law are significant state interests unaccompanied by a means
of implementation. This is certainly true where the state seeks
to prevent death or serious bodily injury. The only reasonable
mechanism to implement state interests in the unborn is through
existing abuse and neglect statutes. Since these statutes can be
construed to include the unborn, protection of legitimate state
interests calls for such an interpretation. . . . Doing so will nourish
important state interests, and extend long overdue legal protec-
tion to the unborn.”161
A judge in Ohio similarly ruled that a newborn showing drugs in
his or her initial toxicology screen is per se an abused child.162 In the
relatively recent case of In re Benjamin M., an appellate court in
Tennessee interpreted the applicable child abuse statute to afford
entitling it to the full protections of the law. Whether the Legislature can confer rights
on the unborn will be decided by the courts only if, and when, the Legislature enacts such
legislation. But in doing so, the Legislature must consider the mother’s paramount right
to privacy and bodily integrity.”); Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (holding unborn children are not included in the definition of dependent children);
Bay Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dittrick (In re Dittrick Infant), 263 N.W.2d 37, 39
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the legislature did not intend application of the
probate code to unborn children); In re Unborn Child of Starks, 18 P.3d 342, 348 (Okla.
2001) (holding that unborn children are not included in the definition of “child” in the
Oklahoma Children’s Code).
159. In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (1990).
160. Id. at 285.
161. Id. at 285–86 (emphasis added).
162. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ohio 2000).
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protection to unborn children, observing: “When a child is born alive
but injured, the pre-birth timing of the actions is not dispositive.”163
Moreover, an appellate court in Texas has held that evidence of the
mother’s cocaine use during pregnancy was both legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her
parental rights was in the child’s best interest.164
In a much older Michigan case, In re Baby X, the initial question
before the Court of Appeals was whether a pregnant woman’s behav-
ior is relevant to a determination of whether she neglected her living
child.165 In that particular legal controversy, the mother unsuccess-
fully argued that her prenatal conduct could not constitute neglect or
abuse.166 In holding that a newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal
symptoms as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction is a
“neglected” child within the jurisdiction of the probate court, the appel-
late court expressly declared that “[s]ince a child has a legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body, we believe it is within this best
interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right.”167
In an almost identical case decided in New York, a family court
judge upheld a decision of the commissioner of social services to charge
a mother with negligence for exposing her prenatal child to cocaine
during pregnancy.168 In so ruling, the judge specifically recognized
the prenatal child’s right to be born “with a sound mind and body
free from parentally inflicted abuse or neglect.”169
Another significant Michigan case, In re Dittrick Infant, involved
allegations of ongoing physical and sexual abuse of an unborn child’s
163. In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 850–51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
164. Cervantes-Peterson v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006). But see In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525, 527–28 (Ct. App. 1981)
(refusing to apply the juvenile dependency statute to the unborn child of a mentally ill
mother); People ex rel. H., 74 P.3d 494, 495 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that the legisla-
ture did not intend to include fetuses in the child protection statute); In re Valerie D., 613
A.2d 748, 756 (Conn. 1992) (“The respondent claims first that § 45a-717(f)(2), properly con-
strued, does not permit the termination of parental rights based upon the prenatal conduct
of the mother. We agree.”); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 1246, 1252–53 (N.J.
1999) (“Drug use during pregnancy, in and of itself, does not constitute a harm to the child
under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1). Prenatal drug use does not, without more, establish pa-
rental unfitness or an inability to parent. We emphasize that the purpose of termination
is always to effectuate the best interests of the child, not the punishment of the parent.
The child is harmed by the mother’s drug use, however, when that drug use results in the
child being born addicted to drugs with the attendant suffering caused by such addiction.”
(citations omitted)); In re Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243–44 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (holding
that the mother’s occasional drug use during pregnancy, without proof of drug addiction
or negligence after the child was born, is insufficient as prima facie evidence of neglect).
165. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
168. In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
169. Id. at 448.
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siblings.170 The probate court assumed jurisdiction over the prenatal
child under MCL § 712A.2, which provides in pertinent part:
The court has the following authority and jurisdiction: . . .
(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 18
years of age found within the county: . . . (2) Whose home or en-
vironment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality,
or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult,
or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.171
The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the Michigan legis-
lature did not intend application of “these provisions” to prenatal
children.172 At least one court in Michigan has subsequently held
that this particular ruling is not dispositive.173
In Dittrick, the probate court assumed jurisdiction over the
prenatal child pursuant to MCL § 712A.2 (b)(2), which addresses
the “home environment” of the child.174 What if the “home environ-
ment” in question is a womb? Dittrick did not involve a situation in
which the life of the prenatal child was in danger.175 The Bay County
Department of Social Services never alleged direct abuse or neglect
toward the prenatal child.176 Although the appellate court in Dittrick
held that the Department of Social Services and the probate court
acted without proper authority under the existing statutes as written,
it invited lawmakers to make desirable legislative changes so as to
permit action in the best interests of all concerned:
The Legislature may wish to consider appropriate amend-
ments to the Probate Code. Indeed, the background of the present
170. Bay Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs. v. Dittrick (In re Dittrick Infant), 263 N.W.2d 37, 38
(Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
171. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2 (West 2011).
172. Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d at 39 (“However, we are persuaded by the defendants’ alterna-
tive argument that the probate court did not have jurisdiction to enter the contested order
because it could not acquire jurisdiction over an unborn child . . . . However, our reading
of other sections of Chapter XIIA of the Probate Code convinces us that the Legislature
did not intend application of these provisions to unborn children.”(citations omitted)).
173. The Circuit Court in Calhoun County affirmed an order of the Juvenile Court re-
quiring the mother, over her religious objections, to take insulin injections to preserve the
life and health of her unborn child. See DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE
LAW MANUAL, CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTION 68 [hereinafter MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW],
available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/MCWLChap3_33856_7_382143_7
.pdf (“Dittrick was distinguished in that there were no allegations of direct abuse or neglect
toward the fetus itself and no evidence of danger or threat of harm to the unborn child.
There was substantial likelihood of harm facing the Wilson Child. . . .”(citing Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981)).
174. Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
175. Id. at 38.
176. Id.
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case has convinced us that such amendments would be desir-
able. . . . Although the plaintiff Bay County Department of Social
Services and the probate court acted without proper authority,
we nevertheless believe that their actions were “correct” in the
sense that the best interests of all concerned required that the
defendants’ infant not be left in the defendants’ custody.177
Indeed, nothing in the Dittrick decision prevents a judge from find-
ing that the Michigan legislature intended for the term “child” to
include prenatal children.178 In fact, the Court of Appeals expressly
recognized that the word “child” could be interpreted to apply to
unborn children.179
The highest court in Illinois, however, has refused to allow a
cause of action of a child against his or her mother for unintentional
injuries sustained in an automobile collision due to the mother’s neg-
ligent driving.180 In the case of Stallman v. Youngquist, the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to subject a pregnant woman to tort liability,
reasoning that to do so would require a judicially defined standard
of conduct which was neither possible nor justified:
Holding a third person liable for prenatal injuries furthers
the interests of both the mother and the subsequently born child
and does not interfere with the defendant’s right to control his or
her own life. Holding a mother liable for the unintentional
infliction of prenatal injuries subjects to State scrutiny all the
decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry a preg-
nancy to term, and infringes on her right to privacy and bodily
autonomy. . . . It is, after all, the whole life of the pregnant
woman which impacts on the development of the fetus. As op-
posed to the third-party defendant, it is the mother’s every
waking and sleeping moment which, for better or worse, shapes
the prenatal environment which forms the world for the develop-
ing fetus. That this is so is not a pregnant woman’s fault: it is a
fact of life.181
Of course, that particular set of circumstances involved a negligent
tort as opposed to a pregnant woman’s intentional or reckless conduct
in a case involving substantiated maternal substance abuse.182 The
177. Bay Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dittrick (In re Dittrick Infant), 263 N.W.2d 37,
39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
178. Id.
179. Id. (“We recognize that the word ‘child’ could be read as applying even to unborn
persons.”).
180. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988).
181. Id. at 360.
182. Id. at 355–56.
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Illinois Supreme Court did not recognize that a prenatal child has
rights “hostile to and assertable against its mother” but left intact
their prior decision that unborn children have rights in tort against
third parties.183
4. Criminal Prosecution of Mothers Who Harm Their
Prenatal Children
Another main category of cases involving harm to prenatal
children consists of criminal proceedings in which pregnant women
are charged with harming their own children before they are born.
Many courts over the years have been reluctant to uphold charges
against pregnant women for damage done to their unborn children
as a result of maternal substance abuse.184 However, nearly a decade
183. Id. at 360. (“It would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person
with rights hostile to and assertable against its mother. . . . No other defendant must go
through biological changes of the most profound type, possibly at the risk of her own life,
in order to bring forth an adversary into the world.”).
184. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cnty., 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913
(Ct. App. 1977) (holding that “child” in the California child abuse and neglect statute did
not apply to unborn children); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (holding
that the term “delivery” in statute criminalizing distribution of controlled substances to an
infant did not apply to woman who delivered drugs to her child either before birth or after
birth but before the umbilical cord was cut); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the legislature considered and explicitly rejected criminal
penalties against mothers for exposing their children to drugs in utero); State v. Luster,
419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the term “deliver” in Georgia’s drug
delivery statute did not apply to a mother who passed drugs to her unborn child in utero);
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1993) (holding that Kentucky’s criminal
abuse statute did not apply to unborn children because the word “person” in the statute did
not apply to unborn children); Cochran v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2010)
(citing Commonwealth v. Welch to again hold that Kentucky’s criminal abuse statute did
not apply to a woman’s conduct during pregnancy); State v. Armstard, 991 So. 2d 116, 126
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Louisiana’s cruelty to juveniles statute did not apply to
a mother who transmitted illegal substances to her child through the umbilical cord after
birth); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]his Court is not at
liberty to create a crime. We are not persuaded that a pregnant woman’s use of cocaine,
which might result in the postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites through the umbilical
cord to her infant, is the type of conduct that the Legislature intended to be prosecuted
under the delivery-of-cocaine statute, thereby subjecting the woman to the possibility of
up to twenty years in prison and a fine of $ 25,000. This, in our opinion, would not be a rea-
sonable construction of the statute.”); State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205.4 explicitly precluded criminal child endanger-
ment charges against a mother for harming her prenatal child through the use of illicit
substances during pregnancy); Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 597 (Nev. 1994) (woman
transmitting cocaine to child born through umbilical cord before cut was not criminally
liable); State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St. 3d 514 (1992) (holding that Ohio’s child endangerment
statute didn’t apply to a woman who used drugs while pregnant); State v. Deborah J.Z., 596
N.W.2d 490, 493 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to uphold charging a woman with attempted
first-degree homicide and reckless injury when she drank heavily during pregnancy in an
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ago, the highest court in South Carolina upheld the homicide by child
abuse conviction of a woman who gave birth to a stillborn child after
using cocaine during her pregnancy.185 In so ruling, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina interpreted the applicable homicide statute186
to encompass a mother who acts with “extreme indifference to human
life” by using cocaine when she knows that she is pregnant.187 This
particular decision hinged largely upon the previous appellate ruling
in Whitner v. State, a landmark case in which a prenatal child was
deemed to be a “person” for purposes of the Children’s Code.188
In 1992, Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect
after her baby was born with cocaine metabolites in its system and
was sentenced to serve eight years in prison.189 Ms. Whitner thereafter
filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel on the ground that her defense attorney failed to inform
her that the statute under which she was being prosecuted might not
apply to prenatal drug use.190 In affirming Ms. Whitner’s conviction,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina swiftly rejected her argument
that prosecuting a pregnant woman for using crack cocaine “uncon-
stitutionally burdens” her right to privacy:
It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine dur-
ing pregnancy is encompassed within the constitutionally recog-
nized right of privacy. Use of crack cocaine is illegal, period. No
one here argues that laws criminalizing the use of crack cocaine
are themselves unconstitutional. If the State wishes to impose
additional criminal penalties on pregnant women who engage in
this already illegal conduct because of the effect the conduct has
on the viable fetus, it may do so. We do not see how the fact of
attempt to kill her child because the court interpreted the statute only to apply to people
born alive).
185. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) provides in relevant part: “(A) A person is guilty of
homicide by child abuse if the person: (1) causes the death of a child under the age of
eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life[.]”
187. McKnight, 576 S.E. 2d at 172–73 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) (West
1976)).
188. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1995) (“Similarly, we do not see any
rational basis for finding a viable fetus is not a ‘person’ in the present context. Indeed, it
would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws and
wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse. Our hold-
ing in Hall that a viable fetus is a person rested primarily on the plain meaning of the word
‘person’ in light of existing medical knowledge concerning fetal development. We do not
believe that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘person’ has changed in any way
that would now deny viable fetuses status as persons.”).
189. Id. at 778–79.
190. Id. at 780.
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pregnancy elevates the use of crack cocaine to the lofty status of
a fundamental right.191
III. THE NECESSITY AND PROPRIETY OF APPOINTING GUARDIANS
AD LITEM FOR PRENATAL CHILDREN
A. Kermit Gosnell: A Case Study for the Necessity of Appointing
Guardians Ad Litem for Prenatal Children
The infamous and ongoing case192 of Dr. Kermit Gosnell provides
a perfect illustration of the dire need for unborn children to enjoy
expanded legal protection. The gruesome story of his illegal abortion
practice peppered the news media and demonstrates precisely why
effective oversight, even in the context of abortion, is so necessary.
Kermit Gosnell immediately received national media attention
when he was charged with eight counts of murder: seven charges
stemming from the deaths of prenatal children whom he delivered
alive and then stabbed to death, and one for a young woman,
Karnamaya Mongar, who died after his unlicensed staff adminis-
tered a lethal dose of Demerol at his direction.193 During the course of
the investigation it was discovered that Dr. Gosnell was routinely per-
forming illegal third-trimester abortions, and that he also committed
murder on numerous occasions by inserting scissors into the spinal
191. Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
192. See Joseph A. Slobodzian, Update: Kermit Gosnell Makes an Appearance, INQUIRER
(Apr. 26, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/crime_and_punishment/14912
3753.html (“It’s been 15 months since Dr. Kermit B. Gosnell was accused of murder and
related charges by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office for performing illegal late-
term abortions at his West Philadelphia women’s clinic. It’s been almost that long since
he was last seen in court. . . . The clinic and Gosnell became the subject of an investiga-
tion by a Philadelphia County grand jury and in January 2011 Gosnell and nine employees
were charged by the District Attorney’s office. Gosnell faces the most serious charges
including third-degree murder in the 2009 death of a Virginia woman undergoing an
abortion and seven counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of seven infants who were
allegedly born live and viable but then killed by Gosnell, who snipped their spinal cords
with scissors. Gosnell faces the death penalty if a jury finds him guilty of the first-degree
murder charges. But as with the federal trial, Gosnell will spend months more behind bars
before he gets his day in court in the state case. The trial has been set for next March 14
before Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge Jeffrey P. Minehart. Two former clinic
employees will be tried with Gosnell. The remaining seven who were charged, including
Gosnell’s wife, Pearl, 51, have pleaded guilty but will not be sentenced until after Gosnell’s
trial is over.”).
193. See Jessica Hopper, Alleged Victim Calls Philadelphia Abortion Doc Kermit
Gosnell a ‘Monster,’ ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/alleged
-victim-calls-philadelphia-abortion-doctor-kermit-gosnell/story?id=12731387; Sabrina
Tavernise, Squalid Abortion Clinic Escaped State Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/us/23doctor.html?_r=1; Elizabeth Wong, Pa. Doctor
Could Face Death Penalty, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes
.com/news/2011/mar/2/prosecutors-seeking-death-pa-abortion-doctor/.
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columns of newborn infants and severing their spinal cord, a proce-
dure which most definitely caused the children to suffer excruciat-
ing pain before they died.194
For over sixteen years Gosnell’s “Women’s Medical Society”
located in Philadelphia went completely unregulated and uninspected,
despite numerous complaints made to the Philadelphia Department
of Health.195 Additionally, the Philadelphia Department of State, an
agency that is specifically charged with overseeing medical licenses,
failed to investigate Kermit Gosnell personally even after govern-
ment officials became aware that he was involved in two lawsuits,
one of which stemmed from the death of his patient after he perfo-
rated her uterus.196
Even after being informed of Karnamaya Mongar’s death, neither
the Department of Health nor the Department of State bothered to
follow up on Gosnell’s practice.197 In fact, it was only after Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration agents
raided his clinic to investigate suspected illegal drug activity that the
nature of Gosnell’s “medical practice” became public, and local gov-
ernment agencies finally shut down his clinic.198
During the raid, government officials found the grisly remains
of numerous prenatal children being stored in various bags, orange
juice jugs, and cat food containers located inside of freezers concealed
in the clinic’s basement.199 Some of the remains were clearly past the
statutory limit for legal abortions in Pennsylvania.200 At least two
were viable, and several others provided evidence of Gosnell’s prac-
tice of severing the spinal cord of newborn infants with scissors.201
Despite the fact that “Pennsylvania law requires physicians to pro-
vide customary care for living babies outside the womb[,] Gosnell
chose instead to slit their necks and store their bodies in various
household containers, as if they were trash.” 202
194. Report of the Grand Jury at 1, 4, 104, In re County Investigating Grand Jury XXIII
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2011) (Misc. No. 0009901-2008) [hereinafter Report of the Grand Jury].
195. Id. at 216.
196. Id. at 10–11.
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id. at 8 (“Pennsylvania is not a third-world country. There were several oversight
agencies that stumbled upon and should have shut down Kermit Gosnell long ago. But
none of them did, not even after Karnamaya Mongar’s death. In the end, Gosnell was only
caught by accident, when police raided his offices to seize evidence of his illegal prescription
selling. Once law enforcement agents went in, they couldn’t help noticing the disgusting
conditions, the dazed patients, the discarded fetuses. That is why the complete regulatory
collapse that occurred here is so inexcusable. It should have taken only one look.”).
199. Id. at 21.
200. Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 194, at 21.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 107–08.
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These prenatal children and newborn infants, not to mention
the women harmed and murdered by Kermit Gosnell, deserved far
better protection from the government than the utter disregard
they received. As the grand jurors who indicted Gosnell reported
so eloquently:
[N]ot all women seeking abortion find their way to . . . high-
quality facilities; some end up in a filthy, dangerous clinic such
as Gosnell’s. There the patients have to depend on DOH over-
sight to protect them—as do babies born alive, and helpless but
viable fetuses after 24 weeks of gestation. Yet no protection
is forthcoming.203
Indeed, when asked about the Department of Health’s utter failure
to investigate Gosnell’s illegal and dangerous practices, the agency’s
chief counsel simply stated that “[p]eople die.” 204 This incredibly cal-
lous remark demonstrates the fact that relying on government over-
sight alone is inadequate, and that persons outside the government
must be empowered to protect unborn children from illegal abortion,
or born children from vicious murder, when government officials re-
fuse to enforce laws that are specifically designed to protect children.
A logical answer is the judicial system, through the swift appointment
of a guardian ad litem for any unborn child suspected of being a vic-
tim of maternal substance abuse or in peril of being illegally aborted.
Simply stated, the procedural mechanism for protecting these
prenatal children would closely resemble that of existing reporting
processes for born children who are believed to be suffering from abuse
or neglect: a family member, friend, or neighbor discovers that a par-
ticular woman is going to have an illegal third-trimester abortion,
or that she is using illegal drugs or abusing alcohol in a way that
objectively poses substantial risk of harm to her unborn child.
Pursuant to a guardian ad litem statute, like the model law pro-
posed in the final section of this article, the concerned citizen would
be free to petition the government to immediately appoint an advo-
cate to protect the unborn child from preventable harm. As an officer
of the court, the guardian ad litem could in turn obtain an emergency
order preventing the pregnant woman from illegally aborting her
child, enjoining an abortionist from performing an unlawful medical
procedure, or even requiring a known drug addict to be involuntarily
committed for the duration of her pregnancy. Since existing abortion
restrictions in the pregnant woman’s jurisdiction have already been
203. Id. at 138.
204. Id. at 15.
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deemed constitutional, Roe v. Wade would be irrelevant to the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem for the sole purpose of advocating
for the best interests of the child.
In addition to preventing illegal late-term abortions, guardian
ad litem representation for prenatal children would also publicly
expose criminal abortion providers who are collecting thousands of
dollars from despairing women,205 thereby encouraging the essential
government inspection that was so egregiously lacking in the case
of Kermit Gosnell. The appointment of a guardian ad litem on the
motion of a person with firsthand knowledge that illegal killings were
occurring would ideally inspire swift judicial intervention, particu-
larly in cases where state officials have failed to act. Moreover, the
public nature of these court injunctions would also create an incen-
tive for the government to properly fulfill its role as child protector
in cases involving patent violations of state abortion laws.
In addition to furthering the societal interest in preventing illegal
abortions, guardian ad litem representation is also a reasonable meth-
od to protect unborn children from becoming victims of infanticide.
Failure to provide medical care for a child born alive during an abor-
tion procedure is specifically prohibited in twenty-six states, includ-
ing Pennsylvania.206 Even so, it is simply not feasible for an infant,
newborn or prenatal, who is mere minutes away from having a pair
205. Patrick Walters & Maryclaire Dale, DA: West Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Killed
7 Babies with Scissors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21, 2011, http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story
?section=news/local&id=7906881 (“Gosnell didn’t advertise, but word got around. Women
came from across the city, state and region for illegal late-term abortions, authorities said.
They paid $325 for first-trimester abortions and $1,600 to $3,000 for abortions up to 30
weeks. The clinic took in $10,000 to $15,000 a day, authorities said. ‘People knew near and
far that if you needed a late-term abortion you could go see Dr. Gosnell,’ [District Attorney
Seth] Williams said. White women from the suburbs were ushered into a separate, slightly
cleaner area because Gosnell believed they were more likely to file complaints, Williams
said. . . . Assistant District Attorney Joanne Pescatore said: ‘He does not know how to
do an abortion. Once he got them there, he saw dollar signs and did abortions that other
people wouldn’t do.’ ”).
206. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123435
(West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-602, 19-13-D54(g) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1795 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.807 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-3
(West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.9–.10 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.5
(2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1594 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1073 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.415 (West
2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.300 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108 (West
2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-331 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.270 (West
2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4164 (McKinney 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-02.1-
05 to -08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.13, 2919.17(e) (West 2012); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-734 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212 (West 2012); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-18 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-16.1 (2012); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-206 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.71.240 (West 2012);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-103–104 (West 2012).
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of scissors plunged into his or her neck to obtain legal representation
fast enough, even if there was someone aware of the child’s plight and
motivated to seek help. The newborn baby would certainly be dead
before any such representation could be ordered. Thus, the only way
to effectively prevent the reoccurrence of a heartbreaking scandal
like Kermit Gosnell’s “House of Horrors” is to reform existing child
welfare legislation to specifically enable concerned citizens to file
petitions to appoint child advocates for unborn children before their
mothers walk through the door of an illegal abortion clinic.
It is also important to note that in addition to performing illegal
late-term abortions and infanticide, Kermit Gosnell violated numer-
ous other abortion clinic licensing standards, informed consent and
parental consent laws. In this area, guardian ad litem representa-
tion for a prenatal child in danger of being illegally aborted might also
bring to light violations of other laws designed to ensure the health
and safety of women seeking abortions.
B. Current Abortion Restrictions Throughout the United States
In addition to trimester restrictions and bans on partial-birth
abortions,207 most jurisdictions have enacted a broad spectrum of addi-
tional abortion laws, including informed consent procedures, parental
consent requirements, mandatory waiting periods, restrictions on
who may perform abortions, and reporting requirements for abortion
providers. Currently, forty-four states, as well as the territories of
Guam and the Virgin Islands, have statutory limits on abortion.208
207. Partial-Birth Abortion Q & A, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion
/facts/pbafacts.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“Partial-Birth Abortion is a procedure
in which the abortionist pulls a living baby feet-first out of the womb and into the birth
canal (vagina), except for the head, which the abortionist purposely keeps lodged just
inside the cervix (the opening to the womb). The abortionist punctures the base of the
baby’s skull with a surgical instrument, such as a long surgical scissors or a pointed hol-
low metal tube called a trochar. He then inserts a catheter (tube) into the wound, and re-
moves the baby’s brain with a powerful suction machine. This causes the skull to collapse,
after which the abortionist completes the delivery of the now-dead baby. . . . According
to Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers
(1997), and other sources, it appears that partial-birth abortions are performed 3,000 to
5,000 times annually.”).
208. ALA. CODE § 26-22-3 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.16.050 (West 2012); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1203 (West 2012); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 123468 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-602 (West 2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.0111, 782.34
(West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-141(c) to -144 (West 2012); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. R.
290-5-32-.02 (2012); 10 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 91A101–91A111 (2011); 9 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 31.20–.21 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16(b) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-608-
613 (West 2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/10 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-
1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.7, 707.8A (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6703
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These laws typically ban partial-birth procedures or prohibit abortion
after a certain gestational age, or both.209 Thus, there are already vast
legal limits on a pregnant woman’s so-called right to kill her unborn
child, which, taken together, affirm that every prenatal child has a
right to life and health.
Of course, the vast majority of abortion statutes also contain
exceptions to protect the life and health of the mother.210 In deciding
whether a true and adequate “health exception” applies to a particular
set of circumstances, courts would do well to balance any purported
life or health allegations as to the mother against the certain lethal
consequences of abortion to her unborn child. The meaning of “health”
for purposes of these statutes varies widely, if defined at all, to encom-
pass concepts as disparate as the expansive “mental health” 211 label
at one end of the spectrum to the more defined and limited concept
of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily functions
at the other.212 Several states require the physician performing the
abortion to file a report describing the precise medical condition giv-
ing rise to the need for the procedure, and some jurisdictions even
require a second physician to verify that the abortion is, in fact, nec-
essary to preserve the pregnant woman’s health.213
to -6721 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.760–780 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:32.10–11, 14:87-87.1, -87.5 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598 (2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 12M–12Q (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17516
(West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (West
2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.030 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (West 2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328 to -330 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.250 (West
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (West 2012);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-44 to -45.1 (West
2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 14-02.6-02 to 6-03, 14-02.1-04 (West 2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2919.151, .17 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 684, tit. 63, § 1-732
(West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-4.12-2
to -3, 11-23-5 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-20, -85 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 34-23A-5 to -27 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-15-201 to -209 (West 2012); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.002 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-302, -307 to 308.5,
310.5, 314.5, 326 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-71.1, -74 (West 2012); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, § 151 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-42-8 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.04,
.15–.16 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-102 (West 2012).
209. See sources cited supra note 208.
210. See sources cited supra note 208.
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12M
(West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04(3) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 1-730(8) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 170.002(b)(2) (West 2011).
212. ALA. CODE § 26-22-3 (2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1(3)(C) (West 2012); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6703(a) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(4) (West 2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A)(1) (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(b)(1) (West
2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3)(b)(1)(B) (West 2012).
213. ALA. CODE § 26-22-3 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.01(A)(1) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-705(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)(1), (4) (West
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At the time of this writing, thirty-five states have valid informed
consent laws requiring abortion providers to inform women of the
health risks of abortion, the probable gestational age and develop-
ment of her prenatal child, abortion alternatives, and any govern-
ment assistance available should she choose to carry her baby to full
term.214 In addition, most states with informed consent laws require
that these materials be provided to the pregnant woman in advance,
usually at least a day or two before the abortion appointment, so she
has time to review all of the information and consider her options.215
Along with informed consent laws, forty states also have valid
parental consent laws requiring minors to obtain at least one parent’s
2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/5 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1(1)(B),
(3)(C) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6703(a) (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.4(A) (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(3)(2) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.030(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(2) to (3) (West 2011); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 442.250(1)(C) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(B)(1) (West 2011);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-732(A), (C) (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3211(c)(1)–
(2) (West 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.002(c) (West 2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-74(b) (West 2012).
214. ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-1–13 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.16.060 (West 2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2153 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-602, -901 to -908 (West 2012);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 75040 (2012); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19a-116-1 (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(3) (West 2012); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-1–8 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609 (West 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6708–6715 (West 2012); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2012); 902 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 4:110 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.6 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1599-A (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch.112, § 12S (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015 (West 2012); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-33 to -34 (West 2012); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 188.027 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-106 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-327 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.252–.253 (West 2011); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. §§ 14-02.1-02(6), -03(1), -04(4) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.56,
2919.12(A) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-738.1A to 738.16 (West 2012); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-4.7-2 to .7-5 (West 2012);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1 to -10.4, -52 (2012);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.011 to .018 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
7-305 to -305.7 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
2I-1 to -8 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (West 2011).
215. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2153 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-16-903(b)(1)(A) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-609(4) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1) (West 2012); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725(1)(a) (West 2012); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(1) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(3)
(West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242(a)(1) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
33(1)(a) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.027(1), .039 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-20-106(1) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-02(6)(a) (West 2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(B) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)
(West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
330(C) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(2)(d) (2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 171.012(b)(2) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2)(a) (West 2012);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76(B) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2I-2(b) (West 2012);
WIS. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)(1) (West 2011).
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consent or receive a judicial waiver, absent exigent medical circum-
stances, before they can obtain an abortion.216 Moreover, most states
specifically require that a physician perform the actual abortion
procedure.217 Forty states have reporting laws that require doctors
performing abortions to document the number of procedures they per-
form and provide this information to various government agencies.218
216. ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1–8 (2012); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 18.16.010–.040 (West
2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-801–810 (West 2012);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123450 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-37.5-
102 to -108 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1780–1789B (West 2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 390.01114 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-110–118 (West 2012); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 18-609A–G (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1/99 (West 2012);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 135L.3 (West 2012); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6705 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A(2) (2011); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch.112, § 12S (West 2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.903 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 2012);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to -63 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (West 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-201 to -215 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.09
(West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-21.6–.10 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-02.1-03(1) to .1-03.1 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)–.121, 2151.85
(West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 1-740 to -740.5 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3206 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.7-6 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-41-31 to -37 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-7–7.1 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-10-301 to -308 (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001–.011 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-304 to -304.5 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (West 2012);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2F-1 to -9 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375 (West 2011);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118 (West 2012).
217. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.16.010(a)(1) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2155 (2012);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-101 (West 2012); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2253 (West 2012);
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D54(a) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(a)
(West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(2) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141(b)(2)
(West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16(a)(1) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-608A
(West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 135L.3 (West 2012);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6703(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.723, .750 (West 2012);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1598(3)(A)
(2011); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-208 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, §§ 12L–12M (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412(1) (West 2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-3(1) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (West 2012); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-20-109(1)(a) (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-335 (West 2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.250(1)(a) (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1(C) (West 2012);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1(a)–(b) (West
2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04(1) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731
(West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 2012); R.I. CODE R. § 14-000-009(5.1)
(LexisNexis 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-3–5
(2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.003 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-302(2) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-72 to -74 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.15(5) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-111 (West 2012).
218. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2161 to -2164 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-603(b) (West
2012); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D54(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3133,
tit. 24, § 1790(c) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0112 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-12-141(d), 31-10-19 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-261 (West 2012); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/10 (West 2012); 77 ILL. CODE R. 505.10–.50 (LexisNexis 2011); 20
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-5 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 144.29A (West 2012); KAN. STAT.
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However, current enforcement mechanisms for these abortion laws
often differ from one jurisdiction to the next, rendering critical proce-
dural guidelines less than clear. For example, Texas and Washington
specify that the Department of Health is to enforce their abortion
legislation,219 but Massachusetts allows the Attorney General to file
a petition to enjoin an illegal abortion upon his or her belief that a
violation is about to occur.220 To be sure, if state law permitted pri-
vate citizens to make similar petitions, and if courts were specifically
directed to appoint guardians ad litem for prenatal children in danger
of being illegally aborted, literally hundreds, if not thousands, of lives
could be saved and law enforcement agencies could more effectively
prevent violations of law before they occur.221
C. Common Objections to Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for
Prenatal Children
1. Susan Goldberg’s Arguments Against the Appointment
of Guardians Ad Litem for Prenatal Children
According to pro-abortion advocates, there is a qualitative differ-
ence between infringing on a parent’s autonomy to protect an existing
child and impinging on the autonomy of a pregnant woman to protect
a prenatal child.222 For example, Susan Goldberg, a Delaware law
ANN. § 65-445 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.101 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:48(B), 40:63–66 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1596(2) (2011); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch.112, § 12R (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2835(2), .2837 (West
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4131 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.052 (West 2012); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-110 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-344 (West 2012); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.256 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-18 (West 2012); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1(c) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-07 (West 2012); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.79 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738n (West 2012); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.496 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214 (West 2012); R.I.
CODE R. § 14-000-009(6.2) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-60 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 34-23A-19, -34 to -45 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-505, 39-15-203 (West 2012); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.011 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-313 (West
2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5222 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-264 (West 2012);
12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-550-120 (2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-490-100 (2011); W. VA.
CODE § 16-5-22 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.186 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-
6-107 to -108 (West 2012).
219. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.005 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.02.005 (West 2012).
220. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.112, § 12U (West 2012).
221. “By these estimates, Gosnell performed at least four or five illegal abortions every
week.” Report of the Grand Jury, supra note 194, at 79. At a rate of four per week fifty
weeks out of the year for the sixteen years Gosnell’s clinic went uninspected, we get a
number of 3,200 illegal abortions performed by Gosnell alone. In addition, Gosnell and his
staff likely committed hundreds of cases of infanticide.
222. Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of Appointing
Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503, 533 (1991). This
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professor, has argued that existing children are “separate entities”
and protecting them does not require invading the personal physical
autonomy and privacy of another individual.223 In her 1991 article
entitled Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of Appointing
Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, Goldberg admits that
the State’s parens patriae powers may sometimes restrict the auton-
omy of parents; however, she maintains that the exercise of such
authority “does not concomitantly invade their privacy over choices
concerning their own persons.” 224 Parents of victims of child abuse
who have endured the lengthy processes of adjudication and reunifi-
cation would likely disagree.
Contrary to Goldberg’s belief, the government can and often will
interfere with parents’ decisions concerning their own bodies or their
lifestyles in general. Once child protective proceedings have com-
menced, the juvenile court has the authority to order various “services”
for a particular parent, which may include mandatory diagnostic and
substance abuse assessments or compulsory drug screens.225 A judge
or magistrate may also enter “no contact” orders. Thus, parents of
so-called “existing children” are clearly not immune from invasions
of their privacy.
Similarly, as the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Roe v. Wade,
a “pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy.” 226 Because a
prenatal child necessarily develops in his or her mother’s womb, the
situation is inherently different from other “zones of privacy.” 227
Because the pregnant woman’s right of personal privacy is no longer
“sole,” her privacy interests must be measured against the govern-
ment’s important and legitimate interest in protecting the so-called
“potentiality” of human life.228
line of argument, however, assumes the very issue in play: Is a prenatal child an “exist-
ing child”?
223. Id.
224. Id. Of course, the fact that certain drugs are illegal means that certain “personal
choices” having to do with one’s “own body” are off the table regardless of whether the
person is pregnant or has children.
225. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions, JUVENILE OFFICE, CRAWFORD CNTY., ARK.,
http://www.crawford-county.org/juvenile/faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“According
to A.C.A. 9-27-325 (e)(2), the Court may order the father, mother, or child to submit to sci-
entific testing for drug or alcohol abuse. Parent(s) may be held in Contempt for refusing
to submit to a Court ordered drug screen.”).
226. 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
227. Id. (“She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions
of the developing young in the human uterus. . . . The situation therefore is inherently
different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage,
or procreation, or education . . . .”).
228. Id. (“As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a State to
decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that
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Goldberg also argues that providing guardians ad litem for
prenatal children “undermines a woman’s position as a competent,
independent individual,” 229 but her assertion ignores an obvious
reality: not all people are competent, independent individuals. Many
parents are unable or unwilling to properly care for the needs of their
children. The very fact that guardian ad litem legislation already
exists in every single state proves that society does not assume that
all women are competent, independent individuals. Pregnant women
are no exception.
Goldberg further asserts that appointing a guardian ad litem for
a prenatal child forces a pregnant woman to justify her conduct to
another individual, “potentially compelling her to divulge intimate
and private details of her life,” 230 but such argument overlooks an
important aspect of legal representation: guardians ad litem in many
states are required to obey applicable rules of professional respon-
sibility.231 In Michigan, for example, MCL 712A.17(d)(1)(k) specifi-
cally provides:
The lawyer-guardian [ad litem]’s powers and duties include at
least all of the following: . . . Consistent with the rules of profes-
sional responsibility, to identify common interests among the
parties and, to the extent possible, promote a cooperative resolu-
tion of the matter through consultation with the child’s parent,
foster care provider, guardian, and caseworker.232
of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer
sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”).
229. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 533–34.
230. Id. at 534 (“This information might encompass information about diet, including
consumption of caffeine, alcohol, sulfites, fats and sugars; her levels of exercise, weight gain
and sexual activity; her work conditions and home environment; her use of seatbelts; her use
of plane travel; and other details of ordinary life that could affect fetal development.”).
231. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129a(2) (West 2012) (“The primary role of any counsel
for the child shall be to advocate for the child in accordance with the Rules of Professional
Conduct . . . .”); MD. RULE CAL (2011) (“Nothing contained in the Guidelines is intended
to modify, amend, or alter the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes to a client pursuant
to the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.”); ALM PROB. & FAM. CT.
S.O. 1-08(D)(1.5) (Court Rules) (“The GAL shall adhere to the ethical guidelines and
standards for his or her profession to the extent that these guidelines apply.”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 712A.17d(k) (West 2012) (Guardians ad litem are to identify common inter-
ests among the parties, “consistent with the rules of professional responsibility . . . .”);
TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.003(1)(A) (2012) (Guardians ad litem are to perform their duties
consistent with the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct); see also Children’s Task Force,
supra note 35 (“Due to the special needs of the child and the court in proceedings with chil-
dren, the relationship between the GAL and client is somewhat different than traditional
lawyer/client relationships. . . . These differences do not give the GAL the right to disregard
other professional responsibilities. Thus . . . the GAL is expected to obey the professional
responsibilities as described in the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
232. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17(d)(1)(k) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, these child advocates are not permitted to release any
information except as necessary to perform the duties associated with
their appointment.233 Overall, the duties of a guardian ad litem are
loosely equated with taking a course of action that an intelligent and
reasonable person would decide to pursue.234 There are fundamental
personal rights at stake in all legal proceedings, but judicial interven-
tion in child protection cases is benevolently motivated.235 In every
case, the guardian ad litem’s sole duty is to the child and that duty
is created to give the State “an avenue to press its interests in the
protection and well-being of children.” 236
Another common argument against guardian ad litem represen-
tation for unborn children is that there are too many difficulties as-
sociated with determining what the “best interests” of a particular
prenatal child actually are. The challenge to provide adequate legal
representation for prenatal children may be imposing, but it is not
impossible.237 According to Goldberg, the sheer difficulty of ascertain-
ing the “best interests” of an unborn child will “endow a fetal guard-
ian [ad litem] with the authority to take actions to protect fetuses . . .
based on that guardian’s subjective notions of what constitutes ap-
propriate behavior.” 238
Goldberg’s argument that a guardian ad litem for a prenatal
child is more likely to act upon his or her subjective beliefs than an
ordinary guardian ad litem is groundless.239 The risk of bias exists
in every case in which a complete stranger is appointed to advocate
for the best interests of a particular child, not just in cases involving
233. Cromley Jr., supra note 1, at 603.
234. Id. at 607. In addition, “[i]t is only by a clear expression of the court that the
guardian [ad litem] can assure herself that she is fulfilling the expectations of the ju-
dicial system.” Id.
235. MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW, supra note 173, at 55 (“While the intent and
purpose of the juvenile court intervention in child protection cases has been a benevo-
lently motivated one—to help families in trouble, keeping children at home to the extent
possible—we ought not lose sight of the fact that the fundamental personal rights are at
stake for both parents and children.”).
236. Cromley Jr., supra note 1, at 592.
237. MARVIN R. VENTRELL & DONALD N. DUQUETTE, EDS., CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND DEPENDENCY CASES, xxxi (2005) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE LAW] (“The challenge
to provide quality legal representation for children . . . is enormous. . . . At the same time,
child welfare law has become an increasingly complex area of practice that requires law-
yers to not only understand complex federal and state law and procedure, but also detailed
institutional information regarding child welfare funding streams, treatment and place-
ment options, medicine, mental health, and child development. And all of this takes place
in a context of devastating abuse, neglect, and poverty, which makes the work emotion-
ally taxing.”).
238. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 535.
239. Id.
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prenatal children. While these “fetal clients” cannot tell their advo-
cates anything that would aid in representing their legal rights, cases
involving substantiated allegations of maternal substance abuse
would rarely involve grey areas where a guardian ad litem would
actually need information from the unborn child. Either the expectant
mother is objectively harming her child, or she is not. To be sure, this
issue would be no easier to resolve if the child were a newborn infant.
Furthermore, although a guardian ad litem is granted access to all in-
formation that bears on the issue of the child’s best interests, he or she
is mute on issues that do not directly impact the welfare of the child.240
Finally, the professional assessment of an appointed guardian ad litem
is meant to be only one consideration for the judicial officer to consider
in making a final decision.241 Courts will remain the “trier of fact” and
can accept or reject portions of a particular recommendation.242
Goldberg also forecasts that forcing judges to determine what
sort of maternal behavior should trigger the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem for prenatal children will “lead courts into impossible
conundrums.” 243 Delineating “prenatal abuse” is a tricky endeavor,
but prenatal children should not have to suffer simply because the
process is too bewildering.244 The complexity of a matter does not
determine the standard for one’s legal rights. The “duties” pregnant
women already have to their unborn children are not merely “moral
obligations,” as Goldberg suggests.245 As noted at length throughout
240. Cromley Jr., supra note 1, at 592 (“The guardian [ad litem] is mute on all other is-
sues except to the extent that they directly impact upon the welfare of the child(ren).”).
241. Id. at 595 (“Since the best interest standard requires consideration of all relevant
factors, it is not within the discretion of the guardian [ad litem] to omit from her report
that information which the guardian [ad litem] feels does not support her conclusions. The
guardian [ad litem]’s report is meant to be only one consideration for the court in making
a final binding decision.”).
242. Id. at 596.
243. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 537. She continues, “How would the conduct necessi-
tating the appointment of a guardian [ad litem] be defined? Who would have standing to
call for such an appointment? While most would agree that illegal substance abuse is poten-
tially harmful to a fetus and should be proscribed, once courts engage the issue it would
be logically difficult to justify failing to prohibit all conduct which may injure a fetus.” Id.
244. Emily M. Dargatz, Comment, Legal Representation of a Fetus: The Mother and
Child Disunion?, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 591, 604 (1989) (“The issue of fetal representation
in our legal arenas presents a myriad of other dilemmas which this comment does not at-
tempt to address. Such issues include the problem of costs to our society in terms of court
time and insurance and the difficulty in promulgating legislation which would ‘enforce’
a pregnant woman’s behavior. Additionally, one cannot ignore the unique and inevitable
problems which seem always to accompany domestic issues. The problems and issues sur-
rounding this subject are indeed delicate and confusing. But these are all things which the
courts need to consider when they embark on this new horizon of litigation.”).
245. See Goldberg, supra note 222, at 530 (“Professor John Robertson posits that when
a woman ‘decides to forgo abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman
loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus.’ Contrary to
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this article, pregnant women have long been held legally responsible
for harm inflicted upon their prenatal children. Moreover, if third
parties can be held criminally liable for harming unborn children, so
can the mothers of these defenseless children. Again, numerous states
have expressly recognized that prenatal children have an important
interest in receiving medical treatment even when the recommended
procedure runs counter to their mothers’ wishes.
There is no question that a pregnant woman has a legal duty to
avoid harm or threatened harm to her prenatal child’s welfare.246
Having recognized the legal duties that pregnant women already owe
to their unborn children, the next logical step is for the government
to take proactive steps to enforce those duties by appointing a guard-
ian ad litem whenever an expectant mother fails to fulfill her legal
duty to her unborn child. The alleged difficulty of determining what
constitutes cognizable harm does not change this obvious reality.
2. Erin Linder’s Arguments Against the Appointment of
Guardians Ad Litem for Prenatal Children
Another author, Erin Linder, has openly opposed the Wisconsin
legislation allowing the government to take drug-addicted or alcohol
dependent women into custody to protect their unborn children. Her
2005 article entitled Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The Problems
Inherent in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address Addiction asserts
that any such law will discourage pregnant women with unresolved
substance abuse issues from seeking essential prenatal care;247 how-
ever, this argument is faulty because it assumes that a pregnant drug
Robertson’s beliefs, such duties are properly viewed as moral obligations, but cannot create
legal obligations without incurring unacceptable costs to the civil liberties of women.”).
246. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622(2)(f) (West 2012) (defining child abuse as “harm
or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare that occurs through nonaccidental phys-
ical or mental injury”); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19(b)(3) (West 2012) (“The
court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following . . . (b) The child or a sibling of the child
has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following
circumstances: (i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from
injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home. (ii) The parent who
had the opportunity to prevent the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do
so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury
or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home. (iii) A nonparent adult’s
act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is
a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse by the nonparent
adult in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.”).
247. Erin N. Linder, Note, Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The Problems Inherent
in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address Addiction, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 873, 891 (2005)
(discussing Wisconsin’s statute allowing a pregnant woman with severe drug and alcohol
abuse problems to be taken into custody for the protection of her unborn child).
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addict who would otherwise seek treatment would cease doing so on
the off chance that she could be investigated and ultimately taken
into custody after a hearing.
Of course, the same reasoning could be applied to current child
protective statutes which allow government agencies to take custody
of children whenever there is sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect.
It could be argued that such legislation, including mandatory report-
ing laws for medical care givers, would discourage abusive parents
from seeking medical treatment for their children. Even if true, such
reasoning does not justify government inaction in any child abuse
case, whether in utero or after the child is born.
Linder also claims that making otherwise legal alcohol consump-
tion punishable while a woman is pregnant may inadvertently open
doors for the government to regulate numerous other legal activities
that could conceivably harm an unborn child, such as smoking ciga-
rettes or eating unhealthy food.248 There are two main problems with
this argument. First, many jurisdictions already have laws permit-
ting courts to consider substance abuse as a factor in determining
parental fitness in child protective proceedings.249 Of course, these
existing statutes have not compelled prosecutorial agencies to charge
parents with abuse or neglect merely because they smoke cigarettes
or allow their children to consume unhealthy snacks.
Secondly, Linder’s fear of irrepressible government intrusion
seems highly unlikely given the very specific language included in
the Wisconsin statute, the only one of its kind. Wisconsin Assembly
Bill 292 legislatively finds that an unborn child is endangered by
the “habitual lack of self-control of their expectant mothers in the
use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled sub-
stance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree.” 250 Moreover, the juris-
dictional requirements set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.133 already provide
a sound legal framework for all cases involving reported maternal
substance abuse:
The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over an unborn child
alleged to be in need of protection or services which can be ordered
248. Id. at 898.
249. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.011(10) (West 2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 361.5 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(18)(b)(2) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.806(1)(j) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-94(b)(4)(B)(ii) (West 2012); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1)(a)(3) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(2)(c) (West 2012);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(1)(v) (West 2012); but see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(B)
(McKinney 2012) (drug or alcohol abuse does not constitute neglect in the absence of a
showing that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired).
250. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01(1)(am) (West 2011).
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by the court whose expectant mother habitually lacks self-control
in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled
substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree, to the extent that
there is a substantial risk that the physical health of the unborn
child, and of the child when born, will be seriously affected or en-
dangered unless the expectant mother receives prompt and ade-
quate treatment for that habitual lack of self-control.251
Despite what one author has argued, this statute does not allow for “a
zealous police officer who observes a pregnant woman drinking cock-
tails at a bar [to] take the woman into immediate custody if the officer
believes that the woman’s drinking poses a severe risk to her fetus.” 252
In fact, this specific child welfare legislation does not allow pregnant
women to be taken into custody for doing any other legal activity.
Only the most harmful maternal conduct, habitual drug and alcohol
abuse, is proscribed in order to protect the health of the prenatal child.
Finally, Linder urges her readers to conclude that any statute
requiring a pregnant woman to be taken into custody is merely reac-
tive to the problem of maternal substance abuse because much of the
damage has already been done.253 The absurdity of this argument is
apparent if you apply her reasoning to the context of a born child who
is being abused. No one would legitimately argue that a child who has
been harmed in the past should remain in the abusive environment
simply because the bulk of the damage has already been done. It is the
function of the government to protect children, both born and prenatal,
if parents are willing to blatantly disregard their life and health.
D. Prenatal Children Are Especially Susceptible to Abuse
and Neglect
All children are vested with certain fundamental human rights,
including a right to physical health and safety.254 Moreover, all chil-
dren need competent and zealous advocates in legal proceedings that
251. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.133 (West 2011).
252. Lynn M. Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol
or Other Drugs, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461, 492 (2005).
253. Linder, supra note 247, at 883.
254. DAVID KATNER ET AL., NAT’L ASSOC. OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 5 (2001),
available at http://floridaschildrenfirst.org/04_reports/proj/Representation_of_Children
/National/nacc_recommendations_for_representation.doc (“The NACC believes that each
child must be valued as a unique human being, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion,
age, social class, physical or mental disability, gender, or sexual orientation. Each child is
vested with certain fundamental rights, including a right to physical and emotional health
and safety.”).
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can permanently impact their lives.255 As the National Association of
Counsel for Children observed in its Recommendations for Representa-
tion of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, children who are the sub-
jects of child protective proceedings are typically the most profoundly
affected by the judicial intervention and corresponding rulings.256
Prenatal children also need legal representation for the obvious
reason that the life of a child begins long before birth.257 Numerous
medical studies have revealed that a prenatal child develops very ra-
pidly in the womb.258 By the twenty-second day of gestation the heart
begins to beat.259 Moreover, by the end of the third week, the back-
bone, spinal column, and nervous system are developing.260 By the
fortieth day, brain waves can be recorded,261 and by the eighth week,
all body systems are present.262 Sleeping habits usually develop in the
255. Id. at 5–6 (“In order to achieve the physical and emotional well being of children,
we must promote legal rights and remedies for children. This includes empowering chil-
dren by ensuring that courts hear and consider their views in proceedings that affect their
lives. . . . Children need competent, independent, and zealous attorneys. The system of
representation must require the appointment of competent, independent, zealous attorneys
for every child at every stage of the proceedings.”).
256. Id. at 5. (“The NACC believes that in order for justice to be done in child abuse and
neglect related court proceedings, all parties, including children, must be represented
by independent legal counsel. The children who are the subjects of these proceedings are
usually the most profoundly affected by the decisions made, and these children are usually
the least able to voice their views effectively on their own.”).
257. Fetal Development, Chronology of a New Life, RIGHT TO LIFE OF MICH., http://www
.rtl.org/prolife_issues/fetaldevelopment_chrono.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) [herein-
after RIGHT TO LIFE OF MICHIGAN] (“Every new and unique human being begins his or her
life at the moment of fertilization and, if not interrupted, will someday grow into an adult
man or woman.”).
258. What the Unborn Sense in the Womb: Interview With Dr. Carlo Bellieni, ZENIT.COM
(Oct. 4, 2005), http://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/zunbrnsns.HTM (“Already in the
eighth week after conception the receivers of touch are present in the fetus in the area
of the mouth, which later are extended throughout the whole surface of the body in a few
months. But it is around the 22nd to 24th week when the connections will be ready with
the cerebral cortex. The fetus responds to the stimuli that come through the mother’s
womb. . . . Research was published in Pediatrics in 2001 which showed that at the moment
of weaning the child prefers tastes that it perceived in the uterus in a certain period,
although these tastes were not given to it during lactation. Therefore the fetus has
memory.”); What’s It Like in the Womb?, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medicinenet
.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=51723 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“Your baby’s hear-
ing is intact by the third trimester, when sonograms show that a fetus will actually turn
its head to respond to a sound. But studies have shown that your unborn child can hear
sounds as early as 20 weeks and will be startled by loud noises at about 25 weeks”).
259. RIGHT TO LIFE OF MICHIGAN, supra note 257.
260. Id.
261. Id. (“Fingers and feet are beginning to develop. . . . Facial features, including ears,
nose, lips and tongue, form with clarity during this month. Eyes form and darken when pig-
ment is produced around day 35. Eyelids cover the eyes and will soon form a protective
seal, reopening during the seventh month. Near the end of the month the skeleton changes
from cartilage to bone. Forty muscle sets begin their first exercises and, working with the
nervous system, respond with small movements to touch.”).
262. Id.
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fifth month, and remarkably, as in the case of Amillia Taylor,263 babies
born relatively close to this stage of development have survived.264
In addition, more recent medical research has confirmed that pre-
natal children have the ability to experience pain by the twentieth
week of gestation, and possibly as early as the sixteenth week.265 It
has even been suggested that unborn children may feel pain even
more intensely than newborn infants due to the fact that pain inhib-
itory mechanisms do not develop until between thirty-two and thirty-
four weeks.266 The ability of an unborn child to feel pain even before
263. Aida Edemariam, Against All Odds, GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.guardian
.co.uk/society/2007/feb/21/health.lifeandhealth (“There is something otherworldly about
the picture that appeared around the world yesterday: two tiny brown-pink feet, almost
translucent, poking through an adult’s fingers. You had to look twice to be sure that they
were indeed feet. They belong to Amillia Taylor, who was born in Miami last October, 21
weeks and six days after conception. She weighed less than 10oz at birth—not even as
much as two ordinary bars of soap—and she was just 9½ inches long. Amillia, who is
expected to be discharged from hospital in the next couple of days, is officially the most
premature baby ever to have survived.”).
264. Id. Moreover, a federal judge has also made an interesting point in this regard. One
year before the decision in Roe v. Wade, a federal district court heard arguments on the
constitutionality of Connecticut’s law prohibiting all abortion except to save the life of the
mother. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972). Judge Clarie, in a dissent,
argued that while birth was a precondition to citizenship, only creation was necessary
to claim rights. He pointed out the distinction by way of analogy to corporations, which
are considered persons despite never being born. Id. at 234 (Clarie, J., dissenting); cf.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (basing citizenship and the rights that come with it on birth
or naturalization in the United States, but also protecting some rights of persons re-
gardless of citizenship). He hinged his argument in part on the words of the Declaration
of Independence: “that all men are created equal.” Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). A similar argument was made that same year by a
state court judge in Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. in which a guardian
ad litem for an unborn child sought a declaratory judgment striking down New York’s new,
more permissive abortion law as unconstitutional. 288 N.E. 2d 887 (N.Y. 1972). Judge
Adrian Burke, in dissent, argued that the Declaration of Independence has the force of law,
and thus the U.S. Constitution and all state constitutions must not conflict with it. Id. at
893 (Burke, J., dissenting). He also argued that the Declaration restated the natural law,
which provides the standard by which to determine the validity of positive law, including
constitutions, and that the rights set forth in it are beyond the power of the state to curtail.
Id. Perhaps his most powerful argument in this regard, however, comes at the very begin-
ning of his dissent, where he states that the majority’s characterization of the issue of
whether to afford legal personality to the unborn as a “policy question” was similar to the
arguments made in the Nuremberg trials by German officials. Id. at 892.
265. Kanwaljeet S. Anand, EXPERT REPORT OF DR. KANWALJEET S. ANAND, M.B.B.S.,
D.PHIL. 5 (Report to Congress, Jan. 15, 2004).
266. Id. at 8. In response to this evidence, Oklahoma and Utah have passed law
requiring abortionists to anesthetize prenatal children after 20 weeks gestation if the
woman consents. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.9 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-308.5 (West 2012). Other states have passed laws requiring that women be informed
about the capacity of her unborn child to feel pain before the abortion procedure is per-
formed. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1103 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) (West
2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.8 (West 2012). Louisiana and Minnesota have
passed laws requiring that the woman be informed at least 24 hours prior to her abortion
about the availability of anesthetics and analgesics for her prenatal child. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(1)(g) (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2012).
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viability is compelling evidence that developing babies should be
protected from unnecessary suffering, which can be accomplished
through the appointment of a child advocate as soon as the judicial
officer becomes aware of a substantiated allegation of maternal sub-
stance abuse. Indeed, some lawmakers are already taking proactive
measures to reform current abortion legislation to afford greater legal
protection to prenatal children. In Arizona, for example, a federal
judge recently relied upon this “substantial and well-documented”
medical evidence in upholding the constitutionality of a new law that
has been called “the most extreme abortion ban in America.” 267
Pregnant women are supposed to be the most powerful advocates
for the life of their unborn children.268 Yet it is estimated that approx-
imately one in every ten prenatal children in the United States is
exposed to cocaine in the womb.269 Many states have defined “child
abuse” as harm or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare that
occurs through non-accidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation, or maltreatment, by any person responsible for
the child’s health or welfare.270 In 2009, Child Protective Services
267. The “Most Extreme” Abortion Ban in America: A Guide, THE WEEK (July 31, 2012),
http://theweek.com/article/index/231301/the-most-extreme-abortion-ban-in-america-a
-guide (“Arizona’s severe new abortion law is set to go into effect this week, thanks to a
federal judge who ruled it constitutional. The law, signed by Republican Gov. Jan Brewer
earlier this year, forbids doctors from aborting fetuses with a gestational age of 20 weeks
or older, which is before the 23- to 24-week milestone when a doctor can confirm that a
pregnancy will likely not result in a miscarriage, a stillborn, or an infant who will die soon
after being born. That means some women could have to give birth to stillborn babies. The
law has been assailed by abortion-rights advocates and civil-rights groups, who say it vio-
lates Supreme Court precedent and will cause wanton emotional damage to mothers.”).
268. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“Respect for human life finds
an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”).
269. Cynthia L. Glaze, Comment, Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The State’s
Current Approach and the Novel Approach of Court-Ordered Protective Custody of the
Fetus, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 793 (1997).
270. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(e) (West 2012) (“ ‘Child abuse’ as used in this
chapter means a situation in which a child suffers from any one or more of the following:
(1) Serious physical injury inflicted upon the child by other than accidental means. (2) Harm
by reason of intentional neglect or malnutrition or sexual abuse. (3) Going without neces-
sary and basic physical care. (4) Willful mental injury, negligent treatment, or maltreat-
ment of a child under the age of 18 years by a person who is responsible for the child’s
welfare under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed
or threatened thereby, as determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Director of Social Services. (5) Any condition that results in the violation of the rights
or physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child or jeopardizes the child’s present or future
health, opportunity for normal development or capacity for independence.”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.0015(3)(b) (West 2012) (“Definitions.—As used in this section . . . ‘Child abuse’
means abandonment, abuse, harm, mental injury, neglect, physical injury, or sexual abuse
of a child as those terms are defined in ss. 39.01, 827.04, and 984.03.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.622(2)(f) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.9 (West 2012) (“ ‘Abused child’ means
a child under the age of 18 years whose parent, guardian, or other person having his cus-
tody and control: a. Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other
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estimated that 702,000 children were victims of maltreatment.271
Not surprisingly, the group most likely to be maltreated was infants
under the age of one.272 According to the United States Department
of Health and Human Services, an estimated 1,560 children died from
abuse and neglect in 2010.273 That same year, statistical reports also
confirmed that child advocacy centers across the nation provided ser-
vices to at least 266,000 child victims of abuse.274 In 2011, that total
number was over 279,000.275 Moreover, the government has reported
that 80.8% of all child abuse fatalities occur in children less than four
years old and 46.2% of all child abuse fatalities involve children under
the age of one.276 Perhaps surprisingly, studies have shown that the
most likely person to abuse or kill a child is his or her own mother.277
E. Maternal Substance Abuse Causes Irreparable Harm to
Prenatal Children
There is no question that a pregnant woman threatens the
health and welfare of her unborn child when she uses controlled
than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or
protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ; b. Creates or allows to
be created a substantial or ongoing risk of physical injury to such child by other than acci-
dental means which would be likely to cause death or serious or protracted disfigurement,
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.”); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 261.001(1)(C) (West 2011) (“ ‘Abuse’ includes the following acts or omissions by
a person . . . physical injury that results in substantial harm to the child, or the genuine
threat of substantial harm from physical injury to the child, including an injury that is
at variance with the history or explanation given and excluding an accident or reason-
able discipline by a parent, guardian, or managing or possessory conservator that does
not expose the child to a substantial risk of harm”); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100(1) (West
2012) (“ ‘Abused or neglected child’ means any child less than 18 years of age: 1. Whose
parents or other person responsible for his care creates or inflicts, threatens to create or
inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted upon such child a physical or mental injury by
other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement, or im-
pairment of bodily or mental functions.”).
271. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., CHILD MALTREATMENT 21 (2009)
[hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs
/cb/stats_research/index.htm#can.
272. Id. at 22.
273. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., CHILD MALTREATMENT 58 (2010)
hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs
/cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf.
274. National Statistics on Child Abuse, NAT’L CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, http://www
.nationalchildrensalliance.org/NCANationalStatistics (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“47
states reported approximately 3.4 million children received preventative services from
Child Protective Services agencies. . . . Nearly 80% of reported child fatalities as a result
of abuse and neglect were caused by one or more of the child victim’s parents.”).
275. Id.
276. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, supra note 271, at 55.
277. Id. at 56.
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substances278 or consumes alcohol during pregnancy.279 Some states
have already expressly defined “child abuse” to encompass maternal
substance abuse. For example, lawmakers in Florida fashioned the
statutory definition of “harm” to include any “exposure” to illegal
drugs or alcohol:
“Harm” to a child’s health or welfare can occur when any per-
son: . . . Exposes a child to a controlled substance or alcohol.
Exposure to a controlled substance or alcohol is established by:
1. A test, administered at birth, which indicated that the child’s
blood, urine, or meconium contained any amount of alcohol or a
controlled substance or metabolites of such substances, the presence
of which was not the result of medical treatment administered
to the mother or the newborn infant; or 2. Evidence of extensive,
abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance or alcohol by
a parent when the child is demonstrably adversely affected by
such usage.280
Arguably, prenatal abuse is one of the most severe forms of child
abuse because it disrupts human development.281 More recent medical
278. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a “controlled substance” as
“[a]ny drug so designated by law whose availability is restricted; i.e., so designated by fed-
eral or state Controlled Substances Acts. . . . Included in such classification are narcotics,
stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and marijuana.”).
279. See, e.g., Beatrice Larroque et al., Moderate Prenatal Alcohol Exposure and Psycho-
motor Development at Preschool Age, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1654, 1654 (1995) (finding
that consuming 1.5 oz. or more of pure alcohol per day (approximately three drinks) has
negative effect on preschool psychomotor development); Raja A. S. Mukherjee et al., Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder: An Overview, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 298, 298–301 (2006)
(discussing the effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, including hyperactivity, attention
deficits, planning difficulties, learning/memory problems, lower IQ, arithmetic difficul-
ties, receptive language difficulties, verbal processing problems, and social understanding
difficulties); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Regional Brain Shape Abnormalities Persist into
Adolescence After Heavy Prenatal Alcohol Exposure, 12 CEREBRAL CORTEX 856, 856 (2002)
(discussing changes in brain composition in children exposed to alcohol in utero). But see
Ian Walpole et al., Is There a Fetal Effect with Low to Moderate Alcohol Use Before or
During Pregnancy?, 44 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 297, 299–300 (1990)
(finding that low to moderate alcohol consumption (less than 28 mL) had no discernible
effects on newborn clinical status).
280. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(32)(2)(g) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
281. See, e.g., Larroque et al., supra note 279 at 1657, 1658; Gale A. Richardson et al.,
The Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Use on Infant Development, 30 NEUROTOXICOLOGY &
TERATOLOGY 96, 101–02 (2008) (discussing how cocaine use in the second trimester was as-
sociated with significantly lower motor scores on the Bayley Scales of Infant Development);
Lynn T. Singer et al., Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: Drug and Environmental Effects at 9
Years, 153 J. PEDIATRICS 105, 105–07 (2008) (discussing the effect of prenatal cocaine expo-
sure on perceptual reasoning IQ); Lynn T. Singer et al., Cognitive and Motor Outcomes
of Cocaine-Exposed Infants, 287 JAMA 1952, 1952 (2002) (discussing the significant cog-
nitive defects seen in children up to two years after in utero cocaine exposure); Sowell et 
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studies have focused on the dangers of maternal drug addiction during
pregnancy.282 The evidence suggests that prenatal children exposed
to drugs in the womb may suffer a lifetime of impairment, particularly
when their mothers use drugs during the critical first trimester.283
For example, the severe long-term effects of cocaine on a prenatal
child, in addition to addiction and withdrawal at birth, can include
low birth weight, short body length at birth, smaller head circumfer-
ence than normal infants, high incidence of physical abnormalities
such as deformed kidneys and neural tube defects, and an increased
likelihood of experiencing learning disabilities.284
A 1995 study revealed that an estimated 11% of pregnant women
use controlled substances during pregnancy.285 Moreover, the federal
government has calculated that an infant exposed to controlled sub-
stances while in the womb costs society approximately one million dol-
lars over the course of his or her lifetime.286 Undeniably, maternal
substance abuse has a dramatic effect on society as a whole, which
demonstrates yet another reason why the State has a compelling in-
terest in protecting the unborn.287 Harming prenatal children short
al., supra note 279, at 863 (discussing changes in brain composition in children exposed to
alcohol in utero).
282. See, e.g., David A. Bateman & Claudia A. Chiriboga, Dose-Response Effect of
Cocaine on Newborn Head Circumference, 106 PEDIATRICS e33, 36 (2000); Glaze, supra note
269, at 793; Lynne M. Smith et al., The Infant Development, Environment, and Lifestyle
Study: Effects of Prenatal Methamphetamine Exposure, Polydrug Exposure, and Poverty on
Intrauterine Growth, 118 PEDIATRICS 1149, 1149, 1152 (2006) (discussing lower gestational
age at birth and lower birth weight of infants exposed to methamphetamines in utero).
283. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 515–16 (“Studies documenting the detrimental ef-
fects of drug and alcohol use during pregnancy now supplement the growing literature
on the dangers of substance abuse. The use of illicit drugs, alcohol and other substances
during pregnancy can have a variety of negative effects on developing fetuses, including
reduced birth weight, intrauterine growth retardation, abruptio placenta, urinary tract
defects, reduced head circumference, and the birth of addicted newborns who suffer from
withdrawal. The evidence suggests that these infants may suffer from a lifetime of impair-
ments, particularly when drugs are used during the formatively critical first trimester.”)
(footnotes omitted).
284. See Bateman & Chiriboga, supra note 282, at 36; Glaze, supra note 269, at 793;
Smith et al., supra note 282, at 1149, 1152 (discussing lower gestational age at birth and
lower birth weight of infants exposed to methamphetamines in utero).
285. Glaze, supra note 269, at 793 (citing Legal Interventions, supra note 83, at 2669).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 793–94. (“Individual states are searching for ways to approach and remedy
this problem. The goal of the state in this crisis appears to be two-fold: (1) to penalize the
mother for her illegal actions in an effort to deter the problem, and (2) to protect potential
life from subsequent medical problems. In many states, prosecutors attempt to criminally
charge mothers who have abused a controlled substance during pregnancy. However, with-
out a statute covering such actions, their efforts have been futile when reviewed by the
courts. Although criminal prosecution of mothers achieves the state’s goal of penalizing the
mother, it is questionable how the state is promoting or protecting the health of the fetus
by such actions. Therefore, a better way to achieve the state’s goals must exist.”).
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of killing them is clearly costly to society. Worse still, aborting them
has far more astronomical consequences; not only a moral cost, but a
fiscal one as well. Many researchers have spent years calculating the
economic impact of abortion and their reported results are startling:
“We found that the 50.5 million surgical abortions since 1970 have
cost the U.S. an astonishing $35 trillion dollars,” in lost Gross
Domestic Product, he told LifeNews.com on Monday. “However,
if you include all the babies lost to IUDs, RU-486, sterilization,
and abortifacients, the number climbs to $70 trillion.” . . . Howard
indicates the estimates are based on GDP per capita per year
times the cumulative number of abortions since 1970.288
At least one researcher has also cited the Soviet Union as a cautionary
tale of how abortion can quite literally devastate a national economy.
“The main reason for their collapse was internal—300 abortions for
every 100 live births,” he said. “Right now, there are not enough youn-
ger women to reverse their population decline. They are expected to
lose another 40 million people between now and 2050.” 289 To be sure,
these lifestyle “choices” involve not only pregnant women and their
babies, but society as a whole.
F. Prenatal Children Deserve the Same Legal Representation as
Newborn Infants
It is not hard to understand why children need to be specially
represented in legal matters involving them.290 As several scholars
fairly recently observed, “[c]hild protection cases are now handled
288. Steven Ertelt, Researcher: Abortions Cost Economy $35 Trillion Since 1970 in Lost
Productivity, LIFENEWS.COM (Oct. 13, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2008/10
/13/nat-4440/ (“He said that is a more conservative approach than that used by government
agencies, such as the EPA—which employs an ‘estimated statistical life’ as a benchmark
for its cost/benefit analyses for new regulations. A typical ESL averages about $7.8 million
per human life and Howard says using that as a standard shows the cost for all abortions
to date would be more than 11 times his estimate, or an excess of $390 trillion.”).
289. Id.; see also Paul Kengor, Obama and the Marxist/Communist View of Marriage
and Abortion, AMERICAN THINKER (May 16, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2012
/05/obama_and_the_marxistcommunist_view_of_marriage_and_abortion.html (“By the
early 1920s, Bolshevik Russia had the most liberal abortion policies in the world. And what
happened? Just like divorce, abortion exploded. In fact, the proliferation in abortions was
so bad that it shocked even Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger during a trip to
Russia in 1934. By the 1970s, when America was just getting around to legalizing abortion,
the Soviet Union was averaging over 7 million abortions per year—dwarfing the very worst
rates in America post–Roe v. Wade. The direct effect of this on the Russian population has
been staggering. For the record, Russia’s horrific abortion rates are common in communist
countries, which to this day lead the world in abortions.”).
290. Children’s Task Force, supra note 35.
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in a rights-based legal process where unrepresented parties do not
fair well.” 291 Courts often rely upon other participants to protect a
particular child’s interests; however, despite the noblest of inten-
tions, these other individuals may have conflicting interests.292 For
instance, while the judge presiding over a particular case is expected
to ferret out justice amidst multiple competing requests, the social
service agency is expected to help the entire family and must often
distribute scarce resources to numerous children.293 Since neither
judges nor social service agencies are available to a particular child at
all times, the child needs a champion.294 That champion is the guard-
ian ad litem.
Usually parents are in the best position to protect the welfare
of their own children, but parental autonomy is not absolute. Our
society has long recognized the authority of the government to inter-
vene when parents are not acting in the best interests of their born
children. And now, more than ever before, states such as Wisconsin
are allowing courts to intervene when expectant mothers are unable
or unwilling to protect their own unborn children from preventable
harm. “The basis for intervention in child maltreatment is grounded
in the concept of parens patriae—a legal term that asserts the govern-
ment’s role in protecting the interests of children and intervening
when parents fail to provide proper care.” 295
Juvenile courts, by design, embody this parens patriae philosophy
that the government should act as a “guardian” of children.296 Pre-
natal children are particularly in need of legal protection because
they are incapable of protecting themselves. Sadly, even mandatory
reporting statutes cannot guarantee adequate protection since harm
inflicted upon a prenatal child is far less visible than damage done to
291. Forward to CHILD WELFARE LAW, supra note 237.
292. Children’s Task Force, supra note 35 (“In many instances, courts have relied upon
other participants in the process to look out for a child’s interests. Despite good intentions,
other participants may have divided loyalties and interests and may not be committed to
ferreting out and promoting the interests of the child alone.”).
293. Id.
294. Id. (“For the same reason an adult would not go to a serious IRS audit without
assistance or would not want one’s own child hospitalized without a parent available to
monitor the care provided—the child caught up in the legal process needs a champion. That
champion ought to be a competent and knowledgeable professional who is able to pursue
the child’s rights and interests in whatever forums are required.”).
295. JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A COORDINATED
RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 51 (2003),
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundation.pdf.
296. MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW, supra note 173, at 53 (“The Juvenile Court em-
bodies parens patriae philosophy that the State should act as benevolent protector and
guardian of those citizens, such as children, mentally incompetent persons and others
unable to protect or care for themselves.”).
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a born child. A teacher may find a bruise on a student, but the inter-
nal damage following a pregnant woman’s heroin injection is largely
hidden from public view. A prenatal child cannot talk to anyone or
seek assistance, and, of course, the same can be said of very young
born children.
In cases involving reports of maternal substance abuse, the suit-
ability of the pregnant woman to care for her prenatal child is neces-
sarily called into question. Accordingly, the prenatal child desperately
needs an independent advocate. Interestingly enough, many guardian
ad litem statutes specifically provide for such representation “when
the interests of the parents conflict with the child’s best interests.” 297
When a pregnant woman is engaging in behavior that can perma-
nently harm her developing baby, there is definitely a conflict of
interest between parent and child.
The guardian ad litem’s client is the child; thus, in cases involv-
ing allegations of maternal substance abuse, the client is the prenatal
child. Child clients are obviously in a class of their own since “[t]hey
do not hire or fire their advocates.” 298 Despite the fact that advocating
for a prenatal child would be unlike all other forms of legal represen-
tation, children in utero nevertheless deserve the same protection
in legal proceedings that born children enjoy. The fact that children
are less capable of defending themselves than are adults is precisely
why guardians ad litem are so commonly appointed in the first place.
Since this same logic applies even more strongly to prenatal children,
it makes sense from both a legal and a moral standpoint to appoint
guardians ad litem for all children, born or unborn. Indeed, the long-
term consequences to the life and health of the prenatal client would
make the role of an appointed guardian ad litem crucial at every
stage of the legal proceedings.299
The earliest cases in which a guardian ad litem was sought or
appointed to represent the interests of a prenatal child involved
challenges to a woman’s right to kill her unborn baby by having an
abortion.300 The government obviously has a duty to look after persons,
297. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-111(2)(a)(II) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-9(b)
(West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-17(b)(3) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
21-121(1)(d) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1411 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 27-20-48 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(A)(2) (West 2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-149(a)(1) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-107(f) (2012).
298. Children’s Task Force, supra note 35.
299. See Foreword to CHILD WELFARE LAW, supra note 237 (“Children in particular are
unable to speak for themselves in court. They require legal counsel, particularly when one
considers that the outcomes of these proceedings involve basic human needs, family rela-
tionships, and safety decisions that can be a matter of life and death.”).
300. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 521 (“Typically, cases in which guardians [ad litem]
have been sought or appointed have been of three types: abortion cases, forced medical
treatment cases and cases involving allegations of substance abuse during pregnancy.”).
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such as children, who are unable to protect themselves, but does the
government, as parens patriae, have an equivalent duty to protect
unborn children? If so, to what extent can courts intervene to protect
prenatal life? To answer these and related questions, lawmakers and
courts alike almost always focus on Roe v. Wade, despite the patent
irrelevance of this controversial ruling outside the context of abortion.
G. Roe v. Wade Is Irrelevant to the Appointment of Guardians
Ad Litem for Prenatal Children
The significance of Roe v. Wade is familiar: unless and until this
decision is overturned, the right of personal privacy now includes a
pregnant woman’s right to kill her unborn child.301 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court also discussed the State’s important and legitimate in-
terest in protecting the “potentiality of human life.” 302 Consequently,
301. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Although the results are divided,
most . . . courts have agreed that the right of privacy . . . is broad enough to cover the
abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limi-
tations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical stan-
dards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this approach.”).
302. Id. at 162 (“We repeat, however, that the State does have an important and legiti-
mate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she
be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment
there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.”). The phrase “potentiality of human life” is misleading insofar
as it suggests that the life of a human being does not begin until birth. Arguably, a more
suitable phrase is “prenatal life” or “potential life outside of the mother’s womb.” See also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“Yet it must be remembered that
Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman’s liberty but also the
State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in potential life.’ That portion of the decision in
Roe has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its sub-
sequent cases.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163)); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
157–58 (2007) (“The government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its
profound respect for the life within the woman. A central premise of the opinion was that
the Court’s precedents after Roe had ‘undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential life.’ . . .
The three premises of Casey must coexist. The third premise, that the State, from the
inception of the pregnancy, maintains its own regulatory interest in protecting the life
of the fetus that may become a child, cannot be set at naught by interpreting Casey’s re-
quirement of a health exception so it becomes tantamount to allowing a doctor to choose
the abortion method he or she might prefer. Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does
not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain pro-
cedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating
the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.
The Act’s ban on abortions that involve partial delivery of a living fetus furthers the
Government’s objectives. No one would dispute that, for many, D&E is a procedure itself
laden with the power to devalue human life. . . . Congress determined that the abortion
methods it proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’ and
thus it was concerned with ‘draw[ing] a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and
infanticide.’ The Court has in the past confirmed the validity of drawing boundaries to 
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pro-abortion and pro-life advocates continue to debate whether this
interest in potential life extends outside the context of abortion.
Pro-abortion advocates attempt to cast Roe and its progeny as
supporting the notion that the State’s interest in “potential” life exists
only in abortion cases,303 and those seeking to protect the lives of pre-
natal children read Roe and its progeny to recognize that the State’s
interest in protecting human life exists at conception and therefore
extends outside the context of abortion.304 Pro-abortion advocates
contend that even if Roe can be read to say that rights exist for pre-
natal children, any such rights are simply not compelling enough to
override a pregnant woman’s liberty to make decisions about her
body.305 In response, pro-life advocates insist that when an expectant
mother chooses not to terminate her pregnancy (“terminate” being
understood as deliberately taking the life of the prenatal child), she
loses “the [legal autonomy] to act in ways that would adversely affect”
the child in utero.306
Surely the State’s legitimate interest in protecting the life of an
unborn child is compelling enough to override the mother’s right to
abuse her body.307 As previously discussed in earlier sections of this
article, courts have ruled that children may bring a cause of action
against parents for violating their important “right to begin life with
a sound mind and body,” 308 which implies that children also have in-
terests before they are born. One could argue that the interest at stake
only “attaches” or becomes cognizable at birth, but this reasoning does
not change the fact that a prenatal child’s right to be born in sound
prevent certain practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are condemned.”
(citations omitted)).
303. Glaze, supra note 269, at 796.
304. Id. at 796–97 (“On the other hand, fetal rights advocates broadly interpret Roe
as implying that the state’s interest in potential life exists at conception, not just upon
viability. Based on the decisions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, these advocates believe the view that the fetus’ independent legal
rights exist before viability was affirmed by the Supreme Court. In addition, such advo-
cates look at the rights already afforded to a fetus as justification for extending fetal rights
in other circumstances.”).
305. Id. at 796.
306. Id. at 797 (alteration in original).
307. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (“Only when the life of the pregnant mother
herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of
the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area
need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some
other point prior to live birth. In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given
to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert
interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”).
308. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 Mich. (1971) (quoting Smith v. Brennan,
157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960)). Womack recognized a tort action for negligent injuries
caused to a child during gestation. Id.
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condition necessitates that this interest existed prior to his or her
birth. Simply stated, if this right did not pre-exist birth it could not
be violated before birth.
Pro-abortion advocates also routinely emphasize the fact that
most child abuse and neglect statutes do not explicitly provide a basis
for protecting prenatal children “through the vehicle of the guardian
[ad litem]” 309 to bolster their argument that such legislation was not
intended to protect prenatal children. The government has the author-
ity, and given the stakes involved the moral and social duty, to con-
strue “child” broadly to include prenatal children in all cases involving
substantiated allegations of maternal substance abuse.310 Indeed,
numerous states have already done this.311
The “right” at issue in Roe was not the right of a pregnant woman
to abuse or neglect her child; rather, Roe and its progeny established
that the right of personal privacy encompasses an expectant mother’s
decision to take the life of the prenatal child through the act of abor-
tion. The “right” to kill announced in Roe v. Wade did not encompass
a right to damage the unborn child short of accomplishing certain
death, and even this “right” to kill is not without limits.
Nevertheless, pro-abortion advocates regularly argue that be-
cause a prenatal child resides within his or her mother, according
the unborn baby any independent legal right threatens the privacy
interests of the pregnant woman. Once again, Roe and its progeny
established that the right of personal privacy encompasses a woman’s
decision to terminate her pregnancy by having an abortion.312 How-
ever, as soon as a pregnant woman chooses to forego abortion, or the
statutory timetable to procure a legal abortion has passed, the State’s
interest in protecting the life of the prenatal child shifts outside the
context of abortion and Roe v. Wade becomes irrelevant. Roe and its
progeny were abortion cases, not dependency proceedings. Moreover,
309. Goldberg, supra note 222, at 532.
310. Referring to prenatal life as “potential life” in furtherance of an argument that
prenatal life is not life begs the question in the classic sense: it comprises an assumption
of what it asserts, rather than a demonstration of it.
311. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(13)(B)(i) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-
102(1)(g) (2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-34-1-10 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(f) (West 2011); LA. CHILD. CODE
ANN. art. 603(22) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (West 2012); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-2(9) (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(R) (West 2011);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01 (West 2011).
312. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (“The Constitution does not explicitly
mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however . . . the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution. . . . This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”(citations omitted)).
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those cases involved constitutional challenges to state criminal abor-
tion legislation,313 not allegations of child abuse and neglect.314
The appellant in Roe argued that a pregnant woman is entitled
to “terminate her pregnancy” (kill her unborn child) at whatever time,
in whatever way, and for whatever reason she chooses. The United
States Supreme Court disagreed, stating: “We, therefore, conclude
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against im-
portant state interests in regulation.” 315 Almost twenty years later, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court utilized an “undue
burden” test to determine what restrictions states could place on a
woman’s access to abortion.316 That subsequent decision defined
“undue burden” as “shorthand for the conclusion that a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus. A statute
with this purpose is invalid.” 317
313. Id. at 116 (“This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion . . . present
constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation.” (citation omitted)). See
also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“The woman’s right to ter-
minate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade.”). A
resource for information on litigation in this area is the “Personhood USA” website. Legal
Resources, PERSONHOOD USA, http://personhoodeducation.org/legal-resources/ (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
314. While under Roe in some circumstances the prenatal baby does not have a right to
life as against his or her mother’s actions killing him/her, the prenatal child does have a
right as against his/her mother’s actions inflicting permanent brain damage on him/her.
315. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54. Although the Court uses the phrase “abortion decision,”
it in fact reached the deathly act that would follow the “decision” as well:
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that
the woman’s right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her preg-
nancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant’s arguments that Texas either
has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest
strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman’s sole determination,
are unpersuasive. The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy also
acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is
appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests
in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life. . . . The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici
that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one pleases bears a
close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court’s
decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind
in the past.
Id.
316. 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (“Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with
clarity in establishing not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s ‘important and
legitimate interest in potential life.’ That portion of the decision in Roe has been given
too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases.”
(citations omitted)).
317. Id. at 877.
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Because the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a prenatal
child in no way limits the ability of a woman to obtain a legal abor-
tion, there is no undue burden placed on the expectant mother when
the State intervenes to protect the life and health of her prenatal
child. Although the right of personal privacy is broad enough to en-
compass the “abortion decision,” that right is not absolute. The “right
to choose” is not the right to abuse.
IV. WISCONSIN LAW PROVIDING GUARDIANS AD LITEM FOR
PRENATAL CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION
Lawmakers in Wisconsin have already paved the way for child
welfare reform outside the context of abortion. At the time of this
writing, Wisconsin is the only state that specifically provides for
the appointment of guardians ad litem for prenatal children.318 On
June 16, 1998, Governor Tommy Thompson signed Wisconsin Assem-
bly Bill 292 into law.319 This unprecedented piece of legislation revised
Wisconsin’s Children Code to grant the government jurisdiction over
prenatal children “alleged to be in need of protection or services” if
and when a prospective mother:
[H]abitually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, con-
trolled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to
a severe degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that
the physical health of the unborn child, and of the child when
born, will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant
mother receives prompt and adequate treatment for that habitual
lack of self-control.320
Additionally, this revolutionary statute also provides guardian ad
litem representation “for any unborn child alleged or found to be in
need of protection or services.” 321 Most importantly, “unborn child”
is defined in this statute as “a human being from the time of fertil-
ization to the time of birth.” 322
Not unlike the vast majority of existing guardian ad litem stat-
utes designed to protect born children, the Wisconsin statute directs
318. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 2012) (“Whenever it shall appear that any
child within this State is of such circumstances that the child’s safety or welfare will be
endangered unless proper care or custody is provided, an application setting forth the facts
in the case may be filed with the Division of Child Protection and Permanency. . . . The pro-
visions of this section shall be deemed to include an application on behalf of an unborn child
when the prospective mother is within this State at the time of application for services.”).
319. Wis. Assemb. B. Hist. AB463, 93 Sess. (Wis. 1997).
320. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.133 (West 2011).
321. Id. § 48.235(1)(e)-(2).
322. Id. § 48.02(19).
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these appointed advocates to make recommendations as to the “best
interests” of the unborn child.323 An appointed guardian ad litem may
even petition to terminate parental rights after the child is born.324
However, a separate statute requiring mandatory reporting of sus-
pected child abuse references only “children” and does not mention
prenatal children. Prenatal children are not specifically referenced
until a later section of the law referring to those who “may” report
suspected child abuse to the authorities.325 This has led at least one
commentator to believe that there is no mandatory reporting require-
ment for prenatal child abuse.326
That being said, the legislative foundation for this statute clarifies
that mandatory reporters of child abuse such as physicians, nurses,
social workers, teachers, day care providers, and law enforcement
officers would be required to report situations in which a prenatal
child was in need of protection from abuse or threatened abuse.327
In fact, other individuals who are not “mandatory reporters” are also
encouraged to report the abuse or threatened abuse of prenatal chil-
dren just as they would make a report for the sake of a born child.328
There is no question that Wisconsin Assembly Bill 292 was passed
to provide legal representation for prenatal children in dire need of
protection from their own mothers.
323. Id. § 48.235(3)(a) (“The guardian [ad litem] shall be an advocate for the best in-
terests of the person or unborn child for whom the appointment is made. The guardian
[ad litem] shall function independently, in the same manner as an attorney for a party
to the action, and shall consider, but shall not be bound by, the wishes of that person or
the positions of others as to the best interests of that person or unborn child.”).
324. Id. § 48.235 (4m)(a).
325. Id. § 48.981(b)(1) (“Any person reporting under this section may request an im-
mediate investigation by the sheriff or police department if the person has reason to
suspect that the health or safety of a child or of an unborn child is in immediate danger.
Upon receiving such a request, the sheriff or police department shall immediately in-
vestigate to determine if there is reason to believe that the health or safety of the child
or unborn child is in immediate danger and take any necessary action to protect the child
or unborn child.”).
326. Paltrow, supra note 252, at 493 (“Perhaps in response to the widespread oppo-
sition of medical groups, the Wisconsin statute does not include a mandatory reporting
provision . . . reporting becomes mandatory in Wisconsin only after the birth of a child.
As a result, the law appears to have thus far been applied only rarely.”).
327. Wis. Assemb. LRB-3642/1, 93 Sess. (Wis. 1997) (“Specifically, under the bill, a man-
datory reporter having reasonable cause to suspect that an unborn child seen in the course
of professional duties has been abused or having reason to believe that an unborn child
seen in the course of professional duties is at substantial risk of abuse must, and a discre-
tionary reporter having reason to suspect that an unborn child has been abused or reason
to believe that an unborn child is at substantial risk of abuse may, report that suspected
or threatened abuse to the sheriff, local police department or county department. The
sheriff or local police department, and county department, then must investigate and take
action in the same manner as they investigate and take action with respect to a child
abuse or neglect report under current law.”).
328. Id.
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The child welfare reform pioneered by Wisconsin lawmakers
closely followed the highly debated case of State of Wisconsin ex rel.
Angela M.W., Petitioner-Petitioner, v. William Kruzicki.329 On April 22,
1997, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the government had
no legal right to hold a pregnant woman against her will, even though
she was clearly endangering the life of her viable prenatal child by
using cocaine during pregnancy.330 In so ruling, the appellate court
refused to apply the existing child endangerment statute as it was
then written to unborn children.331
Slightly more than three months after the date of this controver-
sial decision, lawmakers acted to legislatively reverse it. On July 31,
1997, Assembly Bill 463 was introduced to the Wisconsin Assembly.332
Just over one year later, a brand new law passed that specifically
allowed what the highest court in Wisconsin had ruled impermissible
under the previous statute.333 Since then, despite numerous claims
that this legislation violates both the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution, no legal challenges have been
upheld.334 Today, well over a decade later, WIS. STAT. § 48.235, as well
as the amendments to Chapter 48 enacted by Assembly Bill 292, are
still good law.
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
This article has examined the need for swift expansion of existing
child welfare legislation to include guardian ad litem representation
for prenatal children in all cases involving substantiated allegations
of maternal substance abuse and planned illegal abortion.
329. 209 Wis. 2d 112, 116–18 (1997), superseded by statute, WIS. STAT. §§ 48.133, 235
(“The petitioner was an adult carrying a viable fetus with a projected delivery date of
October 4, 1995. Based upon observations made while providing the petitioner with pre-
natal care, her obstetrician suspected that she was using cocaine or other drugs. Blood tests
performed on May 31, June 26, and July 21, 1995, confirmed the obstetrician’s suspicion
that the petitioner was using cocaine or other drugs. On July 21, 1995, the obstetrician con-
fronted the petitioner about her drug use and its effect on her viable fetus. The petitioner
expressed remorse, but declined the obstetrician’s advice to seek treatment. On August 15,
1995, a blood test again confirmed that the petitioner was ingesting cocaine or other drugs.
Afterward, the petitioner canceled a scheduled August 28, 1995, appointment, and resched-
uled the appointment for September 1, 1995. When she failed to keep the September 1
appointment, her obstetrician reported his concerns to Waukesha County authorities.”).
330. Id. at 134.
331. Id.
332. A.B. 463, 93rd Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1997).
333. Id.
334. Linder, supra note 247, at 888 (discussing Wisconsin’s statute allowing pregnant
women with severe drug and alcohol abuse problems to be taken into custody for the pro-
tection of their unborn child).
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A. An Elegant, Simple Solution
Without a doubt, the easiest way for lawmakers to provide in-
creased legal protection for prenatal children is to revise the defini-
tion of “child” in current legislation to include prenatal children. In
those jurisdictions where “child” has been defined as a minor under
the age of eighteen,335 all of the pertinent statutes could be rewritten
to define child as “a human being from the moment of conception until
the age of eighteen.” If “child” currently means a person after birth,336
states could simply amend their existing definitions to expressly in-
clude prenatal children. Finally, states that have already defined life
as beginning at conception for other legal purposes, such as homi-
cide laws,337 could adopt the same or similar language in their child
abuse statutes.
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
Another issue that must be addressed is the implementation of
a clear and effective enforcement mechanism for any statute that
335. ALA. CODE § 26-14-1 (2012); ARIZ. R. JUV. P. 1(B) (2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 101(b) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(18) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 9002A(4) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(12) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-2 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602(7) (West 2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-
3(10) (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-13 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(d)
(West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(8) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 4002(2) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(e) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260C.007(4) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(4) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 43-245(7) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.0124 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C:3 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2(b) (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7B-101(14) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(5) (West 2011); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(7) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 418.001 (West 2009); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2732 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(2) (West 2012); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(3) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(4)(A) (West 2012); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 101.003 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-105(6) (West 2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-228 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(2) (West 2012); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 49-1-2 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202 (West 2012).
336. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(32) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-4 (West 2012).
337. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(3) (2012); ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2 (2012) (providing pro-
tection for unborn children from the moment of conception); ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 2
(2011) (providing that an unborn child is a human being from conception); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 510/10 (West 2011) (providing that an unborn child is a human being from
the moment of conception); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507A.010–.060 (West 2012) (prohibiting the unlawful killing of an unborn child, which
is defined as “a member of the species homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, with-
out regard to age, health, or condition of dependency”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.0
(2012) (stating that an unborn child is a human being from the moment of conception);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2012); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (West 2012) (including viable prenatal children in the definition
of crime victims).
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seeks to protect prenatal children. As previously noted, South Dakota
currently allows for pregnant women who abuse drugs or alcohol to
be involuntarily committed for emergency treatment.338 As an alter-
native to state custody, which is also permitted in Wisconsin, preg-
nant women are strongly encouraged to reside with an adult relative
or friend for the duration of the pregnancy. In fact, lawmakers in
Wisconsin specifically drafted their legislation to provide for an ex-
pectant mother’s release on her own supervision after being coun-
seled and warned about the potentially harmful consequences of her
maternal conduct.339
However, in an abundance of caution, any statutes pertaining to
maternal substance abuse should also expressly require the women
to regularly attend counseling programs and medical appointments.
Should they fail to do so, these expectant mothers could face the pos-
sibility of being involuntarily committed to an in-patient rehabilita-
tion facility where they can be medically monitored around the clock
and receive regular prenatal care. Moreover, in order to encourage
pregnant women to seek drug or alcohol treatment on their own ini-
tiative before a court order becomes necessary, these patients should
receive priority admission to substance abuse treatment programs
sponsored by the government, as is mandated in Wisconsin.340
If a pregnant woman can be legally confined against her will
whenever she abuses drugs or alcohol, then obviously certain proce-
dural safeguards must remain in place to protect her constitutional
rights. The existing child welfare legislation in Wisconsin already pro-
vides a model framework by affording pregnant women the right to
have a hearing within forty-eight hours of being taken into custody,
unless they specifically waive this judicial proceeding.341 Moreover,
338. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 (2012) (“An intoxicated person who . . .[i]s preg-
nant and abusing alcohol or drugs; may be committed to an approved treatment facility for
emergency treatment.”).
339. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.203(1), (6)(b)8 (West 2011) (“Release or delivery of adult ex-
pectant mother from custody. (1) A person taking an adult expectant mother of an unborn
child into custody shall make every effort to release the adult expectant mother to an adult
relative or friend of the adult expectant mother after counseling or warning the adult
expectant mother as may be appropriate or, if an adult relative or friend is unavailable,
unwilling or unable to accept the release of the adult expectant mother, the person taking
the adult expectant mother into custody may release the adult expectant mother under the
adult expectant mother’s own supervision after counseling or warning the adult expectant
mother as may be appropriate. . . . The intake worker shall review the need to hold the
adult expectant mother in custody and shall make every effort to release the adult ex-
pectant mother from custody[.]”).
340. Id. § 51.46.
341. Id. §§ 48.213(1)(a), (2)(b) (“If an adult expectant mother of an unborn child who has
been taken into custody is not released under s. 48.203, a hearing to determine whether
the adult expectant mother shall continue to be held in custody under the criteria of
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the expectant mother has the right to be represented by counsel,
which she must be informed of prior to the hearing, as well as the
right to examine and cross-examine witnesses.342 If the judicial officer
ultimately concludes that the woman is jeopardizing the life and
health of her prenatal child, the Wisconsin statute expressly requires
that one of following orders be entered:
Release the adult expectant mother and impose reasonable re-
strictions on the adult expectant mother’s travel, association with
other persons or places of abode during the period of the order,
including a condition requiring the adult expectant mother to
return to other custody as requested; or subject the adult expec-
tant mother to the supervision of an agency agreeing to supervise
the adult expectant mother.343
This legislation further provides that courts may impose “reasonable
restrictions . . . upon the conduct of the adult expectant mother which
may be necessary to ensure the safety of the unborn child and of the
child when born.” 344
Preventing women from seeking illegal abortions is a more
manageable problem in that it involves the action of a state-licensed
abortionist, a person far more susceptible to the effective application
of coercive government authority. In these situations, a guardian ad
litem could be legislatively authorized to file an emergency petition
to enjoin the pregnant woman from seeking the abortion, as well as all
of the abortionists licensed in the state from performing the proce-
dure (with particular naming of any other abortionists specifically
identified by the guardian ad litem), whether the abortion she seeks
falls inside or outside of a particular jurisdiction. Rather than focus-
ing on criminal prosecution of expectant mothers, courts can ensure
s. 48.205(1m) shall be conducted by the judge or a circuit court commissioner within 48
hours after the time that the decision to hold the adult expectant mother was made, ex-
cluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays. . . . The adult expectant mother may waive
the hearing under this section. After any waiver, a hearing shall be granted at the request
of any interested party.”).
342. Id. § 48.213(d)–(e) (“Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the adult expectant
mother and the unborn child, through the unborn child’s guardian [ad litem], shall be in-
formed by the court of the allegations that have been made or may be made, the nature and
possible consequences of this hearing as compared to possible future hearings, the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to present witnesses. If the adult
expectant mother is not represented by counsel at the hearing and the adult expectant
mother is continued in custody as a result of the hearing, the adult expectant mother may
request through counsel subsequently appointed or retained or through a guardian [ad
litem] that the order to hold the adult expectant mother in custody be reheard.”).
343. Id. § 48.213(3)(a).
344. Id.
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that doctors performing the illegal medical procedures are brought
to justice and their clinics shut down, thereby resolving the problem
at the root source.
C. Model Legislation
The innovative child welfare legislation found in Wisconsin345
can serve as a general template for a model statute. Areas of legisla-
tive consideration for modifying existing state statutes are identi-
fied below:
• Define “child” to include all living prenatal children.
• Expressly provide for the appointment of guardians ad
litem for prenatal children in all cases involving sub-
stantiated allegations of maternal substance abuse or
threatened illegal abortion, and further mandate that
the services provided by these advocates shall continue
after the birth of the child until specifically terminated
by a judicial officer.
• Amend child welfare laws to identify maternal substance
abuse endangering the health of prenatal children, as
well as threatened illegal abortion, as circumstances
giving rise to judicial intervention.
• Empower state courts to utilize more effective methods
to address maternal substance abuse until the child is
born (including taking the expectant mother into cus-
tody for emergency treatment), and to enjoin threatened
illegal abortion.
• Amend state medical licensing laws to require the rele-
vant government agencies to maintain a current record
of injunctions against illegal abortion, and to require
persons licensed to perform abortions to review the list
prior to performing any abortion.
• Provide for permanent loss of medical license for the
violation of an anti-abortion injunction; said loss to be
judged by standards of strict liability under which the
actor acts at his peril and no excuse of ignorance will
be entertained.
• Amend state homicide laws to include illegal abortion
after injunction in the category of murder offenses.
345. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.133 (West 2011) et seq.
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• Discourage spurious legal challenges by including such
language as: “Nothing in this section shall be construed
in such a manner as to violate the rights of any indi-
vidual under the Constitution of the United States, or
under the Constitution of this State.” 346
CONCLUSION
Guardian ad litem representation is so valued globally that every
state in this nation and many countries throughout the world pro-
vide these appointed advocates for children in a wide variety of legal
situations. Prenatal children are the only children in our society who
seldom receive any legal representation whatsoever even when they
are gravely abused or neglected by their own mothers. The time has
come to permit these child advocates to also protect the welfare of
unborn children.
This article has examined the case for appointing guardians ad
litem for prenatal children in all cases involving substantiated alle-
gations of maternal substance abuse or whenever a concerned person
discovers that a pregnant women intends to obtain an illegal abortion.
Irrefutable medical research has confirmed that prenatal abuse and
neglect has profound consequences for a child long after he or she is
born. Hence, when the life and health of an unborn child is endan-
gered by the expectant mother’s own irresponsible decisions, it is in-
cumbent upon the government to come to the aid of these children
just as the government aids and protects children after they are born.
There is nothing in Supreme Court jurisprudence to prevent legal
representation for prenatal children who are physically suffering at
the hands of their own mothers. Roe v. Wade and its progeny of abor-
tion cases is entirely irrelevant to guardian ad litem representation
in child protective proceedings. A pregnant woman cannot be isolated
in her privacy; rather, her personal privacy interests must be mea-
sured against the State’s important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the life of her prenatal child.
346. The “right” to abortion is not cast in stone from Mount Sinai, and may go the way
of other purported rights, such as the right to own another human being as property.
Rather than carve out an exception for “a woman’s right to an abortion,” the model here
follows the drafting choice reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence in dealing with rape
shield laws. Rule 412, for example, excludes evidence of a sex crime victim’s past sexual
activity or sexual predisposition, but provides that the exclusion does not extend to
“evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” FED. R.
EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). From a legal perspective, putting such exclusion in the evidence law is
as unnecessary as is including it in a guardian ad litem law: the Constitution would apply
whether or not the rule said so. Its utility lies in facilitating judicial review and making
legislative intent overtly, rather than implicitly, conform to whatever the Constitution
is currently found to require.
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This article has also cited to numerous instances in which state
legislatures and courts have recognized the legal status of prenatal
children for purposes of inheritance, insurance policies, negligence
actions, wrongful death, and homicide. Since this vast existing legal
precedent already functions to benefit children before they are born,
courts should recognize a prenatal baby as a “child” for purposes of
child protective proceedings. If states can provide legal remedies for
prenatal children who are injured or endangered in utero, either by
third parties or their own mothers, then the government should also
provide increased legal protection for these children in order to pre-
vent this irreparable harm in the first place. Likewise, if courts can
compel a pregnant woman to undergo a medical procedure performed
on her body for the benefit of her unborn child, then the government
should also intervene when that same woman is inflicting preventable
harm on her child by abusing drugs or alcohol during the pregnancy.
In conclusion, since all children have a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body, the State has an unquestionable duty
to intervene whenever a defenseless child needs protection, or wher-
ever existing legal limits on abortion are being ignored or flouted, as
in the long overdue pending criminal charges against Dr. Kermit
Gosnell. As a natural extension of parens patriae philosophy, guard-
ian ad litem representation is an essential judicial tool that can be
readily utilized to bridge the current gap in child welfare legislation
by giving a voice and a champion to the most vulnerable among us.
